It would be interesting and scientifically rewarding to investigate the possibilities of designing a "sheltered" situation room for the Information Technologies and Telecommunications services and products market. The proposed framework might be employed during any phase of the life cycle of an...

This short paper isolates a non-trivial class of games for which there exists a monotone relation between the size of pure strategy spaces and the number of pure Nash equilibria (Theorem). This class is that of two- player nice games, i.e., games with compact real intervals as strategy spaces...

This paper addresses the question of whether neural networks, a realistic cognitive model of the human information processing, can learn to backward induce in a two stage game with a unique subgame-perfect Nash Equilibrium. The result that the neural networks only learn a heuristic that...

We introduce neighborhood effects in the costs of human capital acquisition into a model of statistical discrimination in labor markets. This creates a link between the level of segregation and the likelihood and extent of statistical discrimination. As long as negative stereotypes persist in...

We derive the most probable distribution of resources for a simple society. We find that a probabilistic analysis forbids both too much and too less equity, and selects instead a minimally ordered state. We give the detailed calculations for a special model where the population and resources are...

In a sequential decision problem at any stage a decision maker, based on the history, takes a decision and receives a payoff which depends also on the realized state of nature. A strategy, f, is said to be as good as an alternative strategy g at a sequence of states, if in the long run f does,...

We propose a simple non-cooperative mechanism of network formation in cost spanning tree problems. The only subgame equilibrium payoff is efficient. Moreover, we extend the result to the case of budget restrictions. The equilibrium payoff can them be easily adapted to the framework of Steiner trees.

We study minimum cost spanning tree problems and define a cost sharing rule that satisfies many more properties than other rules in the literature. Furthermore, we provide an axiomatic characterization based on monotonicity properties.

A consumer with diminishing marginal utility in consumption, who can search for lower prices, will balance the gains from spreading consumption evenly through time against the benefits of delaying consumption until lower prices are revealed. Optimal programs of consumption, savings and price are...

For two person games, stable sets in the sense of Kohlberg and Mertens and quasi-stable sets in the sense of Hillas are finite. In this paper we present an example to show that these sets are not necessarily finite in games with more than two players.