Randolph Sloof has written a comment on the lobbying-as-signalling model in Rasmusen (1993) in which he points out an equilibrium I missed and criticizes my emphasis on a particular separating equilibrium. In this response, I discuss how to interpret multiple equilibria in games and how to...

Bargaining models ask how a surplus is split between two parties in bilateral monopoly. Much of real-world negotiation involves complications to the original split which may or may not increase the welfare of both parties. The parties must decide which complications to propose, how closely to...

I am putting together a collection of clippings, journal articles, and original material to accompany my game theory book. It is due at the publisher's September 1, 1999. This is the preface, in which I explain my choice of items to include.

I am putting together a collection of clippings, journal articles, and original material to accompany my game theory book. It is due at the publisher's September 1, 1999. This is the table of contents.