According to the standard definition, a Bayesian agent is one who forms his posterior belief by conditioning his prior belief on what he has learned, that is, on facts of which he has become certain. Here it is shown that Bayesianism can be described without assuming that the agent acquires any...

I am putting together a collection of clippings, journal articles, and original material to accompany my game theory book. It is due at the publisher's September 1, 1999. This is the preface, in which I explain my choice of items to include.

I am putting together a collection of clippings, journal articles, and original material to accompany my game theory book. It is due at the publisher's September 1, 1999. This is the table of contents.

We identify and investigate the basic `hold-up' problem which arises whenever each party to a contingent contract has to pay some ex-ante cost for the contract to become feasible. We then proceed to show that, under plausible circumstances, a `contractual solution' to this hold-up problem is not...

We propose a quantum-like description of markets and economics. The approach has roots in the recently developed quantum game theory. Quantum Zeno paradoxes and noncomutative quantum mecanics are also discussed.

I consider issues in distributed computation that should be of relevance to game theory. In particular, I focus on (a) representing knowledge and uncertainty, (b) dealing with failures, and (c) specification of mechanisms.

Upon observing a signal, a Bayesian decision maker updates her probability distribution over the state space, chooses an action, and receives a payoff that depends on the state and the action taken. An information structure determines the set of possible signals and the probability of each...

A new integral for capacities, different from the Choquet integral, is introduced and characterized. The main feature of the new integral is concavity, which might be interpreted as uncertainty aversion. The integral is then extended to fuzzy capacities, which assign subjective expected values...

We study option management by committee. Analysis is illustrated by tenure decisions. Our innovations are two-fold: we treat the committee's problem as one of social choice, not of information aggregation; and we endogenise the outside option: rejecting a candidate at either the probationary or...