Showing 1 - 10 of 172
This paper shows that altruism may be beneficial in bargaining when there is competition for bargaining partners. In a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124853
We examine a simple bargaining setting, where heterogeneous buyers and sellers are repeatedly matched with each other …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005062338
We study a simple bargaining mechanism in which each player puts a prize to his resources before leaving the game. The …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124854
bargaining is the unique solution satisfying efficiency, symmetry, affine transformation invariance and monotonicity in pure … bargaining games with basis utility. Characterization of the Nash (1950) bargaining solution requires the assumption of the … proportional bargaining based on Gul (1988). Further noncooperative application is demonstrated by showing that quantal response …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407599
We examine a new class of games, which we call social games, where players not only choose strategies but also choose with whom they play. A group of players who are dissatisfied with the play of their current partners can join together and play a new equilibrium. This imposes new refinements on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005062336
In this paper we characterize the set of rules satisfying additivity on the estate along with additivity on the estate and the claims in bankruptcy problems and other related problems. Moreover, new characterizations of the well known rules based on the principles of "equal award", "equal loss",...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005062337
We introduce a new value for NTU games with coalition structure. This value coincides with the consistent value for trivial coalition structures, and with the Owen value for TU games with coalition structure. Furthermore, we present two characterizations: the first one using a consistency...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005062354
We design a simple protocol of coalition formation. A society grows up by sequentially incorporating new members. The negotiations are always bilateral. We study this protocol in the context of non-transferable utility (NTU) games in characteristic function form. When the corresponding NTU game...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118549
Aumann's and Roth's views can be traced back to a difference (risky versus riskless) in the bargaining procedure. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118554
We implement the levels structure value (Winter, 1989) for cooperative transfer utility games with a levels structure. The mechanism is a generalization of the bidding mechanism by Perez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001).
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118656