Showing 1 - 10 of 178
definitions, as well as the relationship to renegotiation-proof equilibrium. It is possible for repeated matching equilibria to be … completely distinct from renegotiation-proof equilibria, and even to be Pareto inefficient. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005062336
We analyze the problem of coordinating upon asymmetric equilibria in a symmetric game, such as the battle-of-the-sexes. In repeated interaction, asymmetric coordination is possible possible via symmetric repeated game strategies. This requires that players randomize initially and adopt a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407601
In a repeated game with private information, a perfect public equilibrium (PPE) can break down if communication is not necessarily simultaneous or if players can “spy” on each others’ information. An ex post perfect public equilibrium (EPPPE) is a PPE that is ex post incentive compatible...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407608
Folk Theorems in repeated games hold fixed the game payoffs, while the discount factor is varied freely. We show that these results may be sensitive to the order of limits in situations where players move asynchronously. Specifically, we show that when moves are asynchronous, then for a fixed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550877
This paper examines the issue of multiplicity of equilibria in alternating move repeated games with two players. Such games are canonical models of environments with repeated, asynchronous choices due to inertia or replacement. We focus our attention on Markov Perfect equilibria (MPE). These are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550884
The standard model of repeated games assumes perfect synchronization in the timing of decisions between the players. In many natural settings, however, choices are made synchronously so that only one player can move at a given time. This paper studies a family of repeated settings in which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118607
purification with recent results from the rational learning literature. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407541
of evolutionary and learning processes in this game. Only the continuous best response dynamic uniquely selects the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550927
For each outcome (i.e.~a payoff vector augmented with a coalition structure) of a TU-game with a non-empty coalition structure core there exists a finite sequence of successively dominating outcomes that terminates in the coalition structure core. In order to obtain this result a restrictive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407594
This paper strengthens the result of Sengupta and Sengupta (1996). We show that for the class of games with nonempty cores the core can be reached in a bounded number of proposals and counterproposals. Our result is more general than this: the boundedness holds for any two imputations with an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407616