Gul (Econometrica, 1989) introduces a non-cooperative bargaining procedure and claims that the payoffs of the resulting efficient stationary subgame perfect equilibria are close to the Shapley value of the underlying transferable utility game (when the discount factor is close to 1). We exhibit...

A characteristic of many bargaining situations is that the negotiators represents the interests of a set of parties (trade unions, political parties, etc.) with composite interests, whose bargaining behaviour is regulated by some collective decision mechanism. In this paper we provide a natural...

We make three contributions to the theory of contracting under asymmetric information. First, we establish a competitive analog to the revelation principle which we call the implementation principle. This principle provides a complete characterization of all incentive compatible, indirect...

It would be interesting and scientifically rewarding to investigate the possibilities of designing a "sheltered" situation room for the Information Technologies and Telecommunications services and products market. The proposed framework might be employed during any phase of the life cycle of an...

This short paper isolates a non-trivial class of games for which there exists a monotone relation between the size of pure strategy spaces and the number of pure Nash equilibria (Theorem). This class is that of two- player nice games, i.e., games with compact real intervals as strategy spaces...

This paper addresses the question of whether neural networks, a realistic cognitive model of the human information processing, can learn to backward induce in a two stage game with a unique subgame-perfect Nash Equilibrium. The result that the neural networks only learn a heuristic that...

We introduce neighborhood effects in the costs of human capital acquisition into a model of statistical discrimination in labor markets. This creates a link between the level of segregation and the likelihood and extent of statistical discrimination. As long as negative stereotypes persist in...

We derive the most probable distribution of resources for a simple society. We find that a probabilistic analysis forbids both too much and too less equity, and selects instead a minimally ordered state. We give the detailed calculations for a special model where the population and resources are...

In a sequential decision problem at any stage a decision maker, based on the history, takes a decision and receives a payoff which depends also on the realized state of nature. A strategy, f, is said to be as good as an alternative strategy g at a sequence of states, if in the long run f does,...

We propose a simple non-cooperative mechanism of network formation in cost spanning tree problems. The only subgame equilibrium payoff is efficient. Moreover, we extend the result to the case of budget restrictions. The equilibrium payoff can them be easily adapted to the framework of Steiner trees.