Different kinds of asymmetries between players can occur in core allocations, in that case the stability of the concept is questioned. One remedy consists in selecting robust core allocations. We review, in this note, results that all select core allocations in NTU games with different concepts...

We provide a result for non-emptiness of the core in NTU games. We use a payoffs-dependent balancedness condition, based on transfer rate mappings. Going beyond the non-emptiness of standard core, existence of some refined solution is proved, including specific core allocations and...

We study a simple bargaining mechanism in which each player puts a prize to his resources before leaving the game. The only expected final equilibrium payoff can be defined by means of selective marginal contributions vectors, and it coincides with the Shapley value for convex games. Moreover,...

We present a quantum solution to coordination problems that can be implemented with present technologies. It provides an alternative to existing approaches, which rely on explicit communication, prior commitment or trusted third parties. This quantum mechanism applies to a variety of scenarios...

We associate an optimistic coalitional game with each minimum cost spanning tree problem. We define the worth of a coalition as the cost of connection assuming that the rest of the agents are already connected. We define a cost sharing rule as the Shapley value of this optimistic game. We prove...

We examine a new class of games, which we call social games, where players not only choose strategies but also choose with whom they play. A group of players who are dissatisfied with the play of their current partners can join together and play a new equilibrium. This imposes new refinements on...

In this paper we characterize the set of rules satisfying additivity on the estate along with additivity on the estate and the claims in bankruptcy problems and other related problems. Moreover, new characterizations of the well known rules based on the principles of "equal award", "equal loss",...

We present a model of network formation where entering nodes find other nodes to link to both completely at random and through search of the neighborhoods of these randomly met nodes. We show that this model exhibits the full spectrum of features that have been found to characterize large...

We propose a variation of the Hart and Mas-Colell non-cooperative bargaining model for n-person games in coalitional form. This strategic game implements, in the limit, a new NTU-value for the class of monotonic games. This value coincides with the Maschler and Owen value for hyperplane games,...

We characterize a rule in cost spanning tree problems using an additivity property and some basic properties. If the set of possible agents has at least three agents, these basic properties are symmetry and separability. If the set of possible agents has two agents, we must add positivity. In...