Recent advances in evolutionary game theory have employed stochastic processes of noise in decisionmaking to select in favor of certain equilibria in coordination games. Noisy decisionmaking is justified on bounded rationality grounds, and consequently the sources of noise are left unmodelled....

Two of the most important refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept for extensive form games with perfect recall are Selten's (1975) {\it perfect equilibrium\/} and Kreps and Wilson's (1982) more inclusive {\it sequential equilibrium\/}. These two equilibrium refinements are motivated in very...

The stochastic evolutionary game literature is built on three behavioral postulates: ``noisy'' decisionmaking, myopic decisionmaking and random opportunities for choice (inertia). The role of noise is by now well- understood. This paper investigates the significance of the other two postulates....

Social interactions provide a set of incentives for regulating individual behavior. Chief among these is stigma, the status loss and discrimination that results from the display of stigmatized attributes or behaviors. The stigmatization of behavior is the enforcement mechanism behind social...

We provide an overview of the methods of analysis and results obtained, and, most important, an assessment of the success of rational learning dynamics in tying down limit beliefs and limit behavior. We illustrate the features common to rational or Bayesian learning in single agent, game...