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According to Adam Smith (1790), human selfishness can be restrained by introspection. We test the effect of introspection on people’s willingness to cooperate in a public good game. Drawing on the concept of identity utility (George A. Akerlof and Rachel E. Kranton, 2000), we show...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010459020
We study framing effects in repeated social dilemmas by comparing payoff-equivalent Give- and Take-framed public goods games under varying matching mechanisms (Partners or Strangers) and levels of feedback (Aggregate or Individual). In the Give-framed game, players contribute to a public good,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011383730
Initiated by the seminal work of Fehr and Fischbacher (Evolution and Human Behavior (2004)), a large body of research has shown that people often take punitive actions towards norm violators even when they are not directly involved in transactions. This paper shows in an experimental setting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012493242
expected. -- Oligopoly ; Collusion ; experiment ; Uncertainty ; negative externalities ; prisoner's dilemma …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008822475
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003395132
to be both consistent across decisions and relatively stable over time. -- Experiment ; public-good ; punishment ; social …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003923879
modelled as a simultaneous, symmetric prisoner’s dilemma. This experiment manipulates the payoff in case both players defect …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009573481
Laboratory experiments by Fudenberg and Pathak (2010), and Vyrastekova, Funaki and Takeuch (2008) show that punishment is able to sustain cooperation in groups even when it is observed only in the end of the interaction sequence. Our results demonstrate that the real power of unobserved...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009380662
If two players of a simultaneous symmetric one-shot prisoner's dilemma hold standard prefer-ences, the fact that choosing the cooperative move imposes harm on a passive outsider is imma-terial. Yet if participants hold social preferences, one might think that they are reticent to impose harm on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009490177
This paper reports an experiment which compares behaviour in two punishment regimes: (i) a standard public goods game …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011380878