Human social networks reshape continuously, as individuals forge new contacts while abandoning existing ones. Simultaneously, individuals adapt their behavior, leading to an intricate interplay been network evolution and behavior evolution. Here, we review a framework, called Active Linking,...

We propose a model in which agents of a population interacting according to a network of contacts play games of coordination with each other and can also dynamically break and redirect links to neighbors if they are unsatisfied. As a result, there is co-evolution of strategies in the population...

We study network formation with n players and link cost α 0. After the network is built, an adversary randomly deletes one link according to a certain probability distribution. Cost for player ν incorporates the expected number of players to which ν will become disconnected. We focus on...

A new model of strategic networking is developed and analyzed, where an agent’s investment in links is nonspecific. The model comprises a large class of games which are both potential and super- or submodular games. We obtain comparative statics results for Nash equilibria with respect to...

If actors want to reach a particular goal, they are often better off forming collaborative relations and investing together rather than investing separately. We study the coordination and cooperation problems that might hinder successful collaboration in a dynamic network setting. We develop an...