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Chen, Yi-chun; Hu, Gaoji - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 15 (2020) 1, pp. 29-56

This paper studies a stability notion and matching processes in the job market with incomplete information on the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012159014

Divorce costs and marital dissolution in a one-to-one matching framework with nontransferable utilities

Sağlam, İsmail - In: Games 4 (2013) 1, pp. 106-124

In this paper, we use a two-period one-to-one matching model with incomplete information to examine the effect of … whether to stay married or to unilaterally divorce. We show that, for any society, there exist matching environments where the … probability of the marital dissolution does not reduce divorce costs under gender-optimal matching rules. In such environments, an …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009754874

Alternating‐offer bargaining with the global games information structure

Tsoy, Anton - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 13 (2018) 2, pp. 869-931

In this study, I examine the alternating‐offer bilateral bargaining model with private correlated values. The correlation of values is modeled via the global games information structure. I focus on the double limits of perfect Bayesian equilibria as offers become frequent and the correlation...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011856724

Anticipated communication in the ultimatum game

Capizzani, Mario; Mittone, Luigi; Musau, Andrew; … - In: Games 8 (2017) 3, pp. 1-20

Anticipated verbal feedback in a dictator game has been shown to induce altruistic behavior. However, in the ultimatum game which, apart from generosity, entails a strategic component since a proposer may (rightly) fear that the responder will reject a low offer, it remains an open question...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011709209

Intention or request : the impact of message structures

Wang, Siyu; Flannery, Timothy - In: Games 12 (2021) 1/12, pp. 1-13

This paper investigates how different message structures impact communication strategy as well as sender and receiver behavior. Specifically, we focus on comparing communication games with messages stating an intention versus a request. Our experimental results show that when a game includes...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012432600

The Coase conjecture with incomplete information on the monopolist's commitment

Kim, Kyungmin - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 4 (2009) 1, pp. 17-44

A key to the Coase conjecture is the monopolist's inability to commit to a price, which leads consumers to believe that a high current price will be followed by low future prices. This paper studies the robustness of the Coase conjecture with respect to these beliefs of consumers. In particular,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011699204

Price discrimination through communication

Sher, Itai; Vohra, Rakesh V. - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 10 (2015) 2, pp. 597-648

We study a seller's optimal mechanism for maximizing revenue when a buyer may present evidence relevant to her value. We show that a condition very close to transparency of buyer segments is necessary and sufficient for the optimal mechanism to be deterministic--hence akin to classic third...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673357

Transparency and price formation

Kaya, Ayça; Liu, Qingmin - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 10 (2015) 2, pp. 341-383

We study the role that price transparency plays in determining the efficiency and surplus division in a sequential bargaining model of price formation with asymmetric information. Under natural assumptions on type distributions, and for any discount factor, we show that the unobservability of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673489

Rhetoric in legislative bargaining with asymmetric information

Chen, Ying; Eraslan, Hülya - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 9 (2014) 2, pp. 483-513

We analyze a three-player legislative bargaining game over an ideological and a distributive decision. Legislators are privately informed about their ideological intensities, i.e., the weight placed on the ideological decision relative to the weight placed on the distributive decision....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011674460

Stable matching under forward-induction reasoning

Pomatto, Luciano - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 17 (2022) 4, pp. 1619-1649

A standing question in the theory of matching markets is how to define stability under incomplete information. This … possible degree of rationality that can be ascribed to their proponents. A matching is deemed “stable” if maintaining the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013472497