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The Impact of Distributional Preferences on (Experimental) Markets for Expert Services
Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Sutter, Matthias; Dulleck, Uwe - 2009
, verifiability fails to yield efficiency in experiments with endogenous prices. We identify heterogeneous distributional preferences … as the main cause and design a parsimonious experiment with exogenous prices that allows classifying experts as either …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010294825
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The Economics of Credence Goods: On the Role of Liability, Verifiability, Reputation and Competition
Dulleck, Uwe; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Sutter, Matthias - 2009
determinants for efficiency in credence goods markets. While theory predicts that either liability or verifiability yields … efficiency, we find that liability has a crucial, but verifiability only a minor effect. Allowing sellers to build up reputation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010294835
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Fairness preferences in a bilateral trade experiment
Ciccone, Alice; Rogeberg, Ole; Braaten, Ragnhild Haugli - In: Games 11 (2020) 1, pp. 1-17
Is the willingness to make trades influenced by how the total gains from trade are split between the trading partners? We present results from a bilateral trade game (n = 128) where all participants were price-takers and trading pairs faced one of three exogenously imposed trading prices. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012227801
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Modeling inequity aversion in a dictator game with production
Rodriguez-Lara, Ismael; Moreno-Garrido, Luis - In: Games 3 (2012) 4, pp. 138-149
We expand upon the previous models of inequity aversion of Fehr and Schmidt [1], and Frohlich et al. [2], which assume that dictators get disutility if the final allocation of surplus deviates from the equal split (egalitarian principle) or from the subjects' production (libertarian principle)....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010369344
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Modeling inequity aversion in a dictator game with production
Rodríguez-Lara, Ismael; Moreno-Garrido, Luis - In: Games 3 (2012) 4, pp. 138-149
We expand upon the previous models of inequity aversion of Fehr and Schmidt [1], and Frohlich et al. [2], which assume that dictators get disutility if the final allocation of surplus deviates from the equal split (egalitarian principle) or from the subjects' production (libertarian principle)....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009754116
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Modeling Inequity Aversion in a Dictator Game with Production
Rodriguez-Lara, Ismael; Moreno-Garrido, Luis - In: Games 3 (2012) 4, pp. 138-149
We expand upon the previous models of inequity aversion of Fehr and Schmidt [1], and Frohlich <em>et al.</em> [2], which assume that dictators get disutility if the final allocation of surplus deviates from the equal split (egalitarian principle) or from the subjects' production (libertarian principle)....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011030516
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Fairness preferences in a bilateral trade experiment
Ciccone, Alice; Rogeberg, Ole; Braaten, Ragnhild Haugli - In: Games 11 (2020) 1/8, pp. 1-17
Is the willingness to make trades influenced by how the total gains from trade are split between the trading partners? We present results from a bilateral trade game (n = 128) where all participants were price-takers and trading pairs faced one of three exogenously imposed trading prices. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012168600
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Diagnostic uncertainty and insurance coverage in credence goods markets
Balafoutas, Loukas; Fornwagner, Helena; Kerschbamer, Rudolf - 2023
In markets for credence goods - such as health care or repair services - fraudulent behavior by better informed experts … is a common problem. Our model studies how four common features shape experts' provision behavior in credence goods … markets: (i) diagnostic uncertainty of experts; (ii) insurance coverage of consumers; (iii) malpractice payments for treatment …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014476274
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Do economists punish less?
Kaiser, Jonas Pilgaard; Pedersen, Kasper Selmar; Koch, … - In: Games 9 (2018) 4/75, pp. 1-17
A number of studies discuss whether and how economists differ from other disciplines in the amount that they contribute to public goods. We view this debate as incomplete because it neglects the willingness to sanction non-cooperative behavior, which is crucial for maintaining social order and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011905088
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Do economists punish less?
Kaiser, Jonas Pilgaard; Pedersen, Kasper Selmar; Koch, … - In: Games 9 (2018) 4, pp. 1-17
A number of studies discuss whether and how economists differ from other disciplines in the amount that they contribute to public goods. We view this debate as incomplete because it neglects the willingness to sanction non-cooperative behavior, which is crucial for maintaining social order and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012227718