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Simple voting games and cartel damage proportioning

Napel, Stefan; Welter, Dominik - In: Games 12 (2021) 4, pp. 1-18

Individual contributions by infringing firms to the compensation of cartel victims must reflect their “relative … operationalize this norm is to apply the Shapley value to an equilibrium model of cartel prices. Because calibrating such a model is … describe which cartel configurations can(not) cause significant price increases in an approximate, dichotomous way; then …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012649687

Simple voting games and cartel damage proportioning

Napel, Stefan; Welter, Dominik - In: Games 12 (2021) 4, pp. 1-18

Individual contributions by infringing firms to the compensation of cartel victims must reflect their 'relative … operationalize this norm is to apply the Shapley value to an equilibrium model of cartel prices. Because calibrating such a model is … describe which cartel configurations can(not) cause significant price increases in an approximate, dichotomous way; then …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013200136

Price and quantity competition under vertical pricing

Basak, Debasmita - In: Games 14 (2023) 4, pp. 1-8

We consider a vertically related market where one quantity-setting and another price-setting downstream firm negotiate the terms of a two-part tariff contract with an upstream input supplier. In contrast to the traditional belief, we show that the price-setting firm produces a higher output and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014426325

Oligopoly pricing : the role of firm size and number

Bos, Iwan; Marini, Marco - In: Games 14 (2023) 1, pp. 1-16

This paper examines a homogeneous-good Bertrand-Edgeworth oligopoly model to explore the role of firm size and number in pricing. We consider the price impact of merger, break up, investment, divestment, entry and exit. A merger leads to higher prices only when it increases the size of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014420154

Competition and innovation in markets with technology leaders

Tsao, Ku-Chu; Mukherjee, Arijit; Ray, Achintya - In: Games 13 (2022) 1, pp. 1-20

In this article, we consider technology leaders (which are innovators) and technology followers (which are non-innovators) to provide a new theoretical explanation for the well-cited empirical evidence of an inverted-U relationship between competition and aggregate innovation. We consider a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013171861

Price competition with differentiated products on a two-dimensional plane : the impact of partial cartel on firms' profits and behavior

Stoykov, Stanislav; Kostov, Ivan - In: Games 14 (2023) 2, pp. 1-25

side and competitive behavior and a partial cartel agreement from another side. The main differences between the scenarios … equilibrium prices were examined. Cases whereby firms prefer to leave the cartel were investigated. Best locations for the setting …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014422280

The impact of organizer market structure on participant entry behavior in a multi-tournament environment

Mathews, Timothy; Namoro, Soiliou Daw; Boudreau, James W. - In: Games 14 (2023) 1, pp. 1-21

A multi-tournament environment is analyzed, focusing on the impact of organizer market structure on agent entry behavior. Two high ability agents first decide which tournament to enter (with fields then filled by low ability agents). If the marginal benefit of high ability agents in an event is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014420155