In impunity games proposers, like allocators in dictator games, can take what they want; however, responders can refuse offers deemed unsatisfactory at own cost. We modify the impunity game via allowing offers to condition of another participant's counterfactual generosity intention. For a given...

How are allocation results affected by information that another anonymous participant intends to be more or less generous? We explore this experimentally via two participants facing the same allocation task with only one actually giving after possible adjustment of own generosity based on the...

We report experimental results on the minority of three-game, where three players choose one of two alternatives and the most rewarding alternative is the one chosen by a single player. This coordination game has many asymmetric equilibria in pure strategies that are non-strict and...

We report experimental results on the minority of three-game, where three players choose one of two alternatives and the most rewarding alternative is the one chosen by a single player. This coordination game has many asymmetric equilibria in pure strategies that are non-strict and...

In impunity games proposers, like allocators in dictator games, can take what they want; however, responders can refuse offers deemed unsatisfactory at own cost. We modify the impunity game via allowing offers to condition of another participant’s counterfactual generosity intention. For a...

How are allocation results affected by information that another anonymous participant intends to be more or less generous? We explore this experimentally via two participants facing the same allocation task with only one actually giving after possible adjustment of own generosity based on the...

We report experimental results on the minority of three-game, where three players choose one of two alternatives and the most rewarding alternative is the one chosen by a single player. This coordination game has many asymmetric equilibria in pure strategies that are non-strict and...

Institutions may rely on fundamental principles, e.g., of legal philosophy, but may also have evolved according to institutional fitness, as gauged by a society's well-being. In our stylized framework where two fundamental principles, equality and efficiency, conflict with each other, one of the...

In two-person generosity games, the proposer’s agreement payoff is exogenously given, whereas that of the responder is endogenously determined by the proposer’s choice of the pie size. In three-person generosity games, equal agreement payoffs for two of the players are either exogenously...