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Reacting to unfairness : group identity and dishonest behavior

Della Valle, Nives; Ploner, Matteo - In: Games 8 (2017) 3, pp. 1-19

We experimentally investigate whether individuals are more likely to engage in dishonest behavior after having experienced unfairness perpetrated by an individual with a salient group identity. Two individuals generate an endowment together, but only one can decide how to share it. They either...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011709208

Equity versus efficiency? : evidence from three-person generosity experiments

Güth, Werner; Pull, Kerstin; Stadler, Manfred; Bäker, … - In: Games 1 (2010) 2, pp. 89-102

In two-person generosity games, the proposer’s agreement payoff is exogenously given, whereas that of the responder is endogenously determined by the proposer’s choice of the pie size. In three-person generosity games, equal agreement payoffs for two of the players are either exogenously...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009751380

Fairness preferences in a bilateral trade experiment

Ciccone, Alice; Rogeberg, Ole; Braaten, Ragnhild Haugli - In: Games 11 (2020) 1/8, pp. 1-17

Is the willingness to make trades influenced by how the total gains from trade are split between the trading partners? We present results from a bilateral trade game (n = 128) where all participants were price-takers and trading pairs faced one of three exogenously imposed trading prices. The...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012168600

Fairness and trust in structured populations

Tarnita, Corina E. - In: Games 6 (2015) 3, pp. 214-230

Classical economic theory assumes that people are rational and selfish, but behavioral experiments often point to inconsistent behavior, typically attributed to "other regarding preferences." The Ultimatum Game, used to study fairness, and the Trust Game, used to study trust and trustworthiness,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011316592

A choice prediction competition for a social preferences in simple extensive form games : an introduction

Ert, Eyal; Erev, Ido; Roth, Alvin E. - In: Games 2 (2011) 3, pp. 257-276

and the other on predicting the choices of the second mover. The competitions are based on an estimation experiment and a … competition experiment. The two experiments use the same methods and subject pool, and examine games randomly selected from the … same distribution. The current introductory paper presents the results of the estimation experiment, and clarifies the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009752422

Inequality aversion and reciprocity in moonlighting games

Engelmann, Dirk; Strobel, Martin - In: Games 1 (2010) 4, pp. 459-477

We study behavior in a moonlighting game with unequal initial endowments. In this game, predictions for second-mover behavior based on inequality aversion are in contrast to reciprocity. We find that inequality aversion explains only few observations. The comparison to a treatment with equal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009752450

Patience or fairness? : analyzing social preferences in repeated games

Duffy, John; Muñoz-García, Félix - In: Games 3 (2012) 1, pp. 56-77

This paper investigates how the introduction of social preferences affects players’ equilibrium behavior in both the one-shot and the infinitely repeated version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. We show that fairness concerns operate as a ”substitute” for time discounting in the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009752853

Responder feelings in a three-player three-option ultimatum game : affective determinants of rejection behavior

Pfister, Hans-Rüdiger; Böhn, Gisela - In: Games 3 (2012) 1, pp. 1-29

This paper addresses the role of affect and emotions in shaping the behavior of responders in the ultimatum game. A huge amount of research shows that players do not behave in an economically rational way in the ultimatum game, and emotional mechanisms have been proposed as a possible...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009752872

Tacit collusion under fairness and reciprocity

İriş, Doruk; Santos-Pinto, Luís - In: Games 4 (2013) 1, pp. 50-65

This paper departs from the standard profit-maximizing model of firm behavior by assuming that firms are motivated in part by personal animosity–or respect–towards their competitors. A reciprocal firm responds to unkind behavior of rivals with unkind actions (negative reciprocity), while at...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009753710

Modeling inequity aversion in a dictator game with production

Rodríguez-Lara, Ismael; Moreno-Garrido, Luis - In: Games 3 (2012) 4, pp. 138-149

We expand upon the previous models of inequity aversion of Fehr and Schmidt [1], and Frohlich et al. [2], which assume that dictators get disutility if the final allocation of surplus deviates from the equal split (egalitarian principle) or from the subjects' production (libertarian principle)....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009754116