Similar Search Results

Nishimura, Naoko; Cason, Timothy N.; Saijō, Tatsuyoshi; … - In: Games 2 (2011) 3, pp. 365-411

The paper presents a complete information model of bidding in second price sealed-bid and ascending-bid (English) auctions, in which potential buyers know the unit valuation of other bidders and may spitefully prefer that their rivals earn a lower surplus. Bidders with spiteful preferences...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009752417

Spite and reciprocity in auctions

Nishimura, Naoko; Cason, Timothy N.; Saijo, Tatsuyoshi; … - In: Games 2 (2011) 3, pp. 365-411

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010369395

Alleviation and sanctions in social dilemma games

Drouvelis, Michalis - In: Games 6 (2015) 3, pp. 368-380

This paper reports an experiment which compares behaviour in two punishment regimes: (i) a standard public goods game …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011380878

Competitive centipede games : zero-end payoffs and payoff inequality deter reciprocal cooperation

Krockow, Eva M.; Pulford, Briony D.; Colman, Andrew M. - In: Games 6 (2015) 3, pp. 262-272

Reciprocal cooperation can be studied in the Centipede game, in which two players alternate in choosing between a cooperative GO move and a non-cooperative STOP move. GO sustains the interaction and increases the player pair's total payoff while incurring a small personal cost; STOP terminates...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011316544

Punishment, cooperation, and cheater detection in "noisy" social exchange

Bornstein, Gary; Weisel, Ori - In: Games 1 (2010) 1, pp. 18-33

Explaining human cooperation in large groups of non-kin is a major challenge to both rational choice theory and the theory of evolution. Recent research suggests that group cooperation can be explained by positing that cooperators can punish non-cooperators or cheaters. The experimental evidence...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009751389

A choice prediction competition for a social preferences in simple extensive form games : an introduction

Ert, Eyal; Erev, Ido; Roth, Alvin E. - In: Games 2 (2011) 3, pp. 257-276

and the other on predicting the choices of the second mover. The competitions are based on an estimation experiment and a … competition experiment. The two experiments use the same methods and subject pool, and examine games randomly selected from the … same distribution. The current introductory paper presents the results of the estimation experiment, and clarifies the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009752422

Inequality aversion and reciprocity in moonlighting games

Engelmann, Dirk; Strobel, Martin - In: Games 1 (2010) 4, pp. 459-477

We study behavior in a moonlighting game with unequal initial endowments. In this game, predictions for second-mover behavior based on inequality aversion are in contrast to reciprocity. We find that inequality aversion explains only few observations. The comparison to a treatment with equal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009752450

Tacit collusion under fairness and reciprocity

İriş, Doruk; Santos-Pinto, Luís - In: Games 4 (2013) 1, pp. 50-65

This paper departs from the standard profit-maximizing model of firm behavior by assuming that firms are motivated in part by personal animosity–or respect–towards their competitors. A reciprocal firm responds to unkind behavior of rivals with unkind actions (negative reciprocity), while at...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009753710

Reciprocity effects in the trust game

Smith, Alexander - In: Games 4 (2013) 3, pp. 367-374

I use data from a previous experiment for classifying subjects based on their behavior in the trust game. Prior …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009785369

Conditional cooperation and the marginal per capita return in public good games

Cartwright, Edward; Lovett, Denise - In: Games 5 (2014) 4, pp. 234-256

We investigate experimentally whether the extent of conditional cooperation in public good games depends on the marginal per capita return (MPCR) to the public good and type of game. The MPCR is varied from 0.2 to 0.4 to 0.8. The "standard" game, in which three players contribute before a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010503532