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Assortative matching by lottery contests

Cohen, Chen; Rabi, Ishay; Sela, Aner - In: Games 13 (2022) 5, pp. 1-20

We study two-sided matching contests with two sets, A and B, each of which includes a finite number of heterogeneous agents with commonly known types. The agents in each set compete in a lottery (Tullock) contest, and then are assortatively matched, namely, the winner of set A is matched with...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014418053

Auctioning the right to play ultimatum games and the impact on equilibrium selection

Shachat, Jason M.; Swarthout, J. Todd - In: Games 4 (2013) 4, pp. 738-753

We auction scarce rights to play the Proposer and Responder positions in ultimatum games. As a control treatment, we randomly allocate these rights and charge exogenous participation fees. These participation fee sequences match the auction price sequence from a session of the original...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010240820

Leveraging possibilistic beliefs in unrestricted combinatorial auctions

Chen, Jing; Micali, Silvio - In: Games 7 (2016) 4, pp. 1-19

In unrestricted combinatorial auctions, we put forward a mechanism that guarantees a meaningful revenue benchmark based on the possibilistic beliefs that the players have about each other’s valuations. In essence, the mechanism guarantees, within a factor of two, the maximum revenue that the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011550604

Quantile stable mechanisms

Chen, Peter; Egesdal, Michael; Pycia, Marek; Yenmez, M. … - In: Games 12 (2021) 2, pp. 1-9

We introduce a new class of matching mechanisms - quantile stable mechanisms - that generate stable matchings that can be seen as a compromise between sides of a two-sided market. We show that responsiveness is a sufficient condition for the existence of such mechanisms and that all such...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012547697

Optimal accuracy of unbiased tullock contests with two heterogeneous players

Sahm, Marco - In: Games 13 (2022) 2, pp. 1-6

I characterize the optimal accuracy level r of an unbiased Tullock contest between two players with heterogeneous prize valuations. The designer maximizes the winning probability of the strong player or the winner's expected valuation by choosing a contest with an all-pay auction equilibrium...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013172435

To tender or not to tender? : deliberate and exogenous sunk costs in a public good game

Heine, Florian; Sefton, Martin - In: Games 9 (2018) 3/41, pp. 1-28

In an experimental study, we compare individual willingness to cooperate in a public good game after an initial team contest phase. While players in the treatment setup make a conscious decision on how much to invest in the contest, this decision is exogenously imposed on players in the control...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011891197

A choice prediction competition for market entry games : an introduction

Erev, Ido; Ert, Eyal; Roth, Alvin E. - In: Games 1 (2010) 2, pp. 117-136

A choice prediction competition is organized that focuses on decisions from experience in market entry games (http …://sites.google.com/site/gpredcomp/ and http://www.mdpi.com/si/games/predict-behavior/). The competition is based on two experiments: An estimation experiment …, and a competition experiment. The two experiments use the same methods and subject pool, and examine games randomly …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009751378

A note on cooperative strategies in gladiators’ games

Ballet, Jérôme; Bazin, Damien; Vranceanu, Radu P. - In: Games 4 (2013) 2, pp. 200-207

case provides an analogy of the conditions under which cooperation occurs in a context of competition between rival …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009754745

Payoff shares in two-player contests

Häfner, Samuel; Nöldeke, Georg - In: Games 7 (2016) 3, pp. 1-7

In imperfectly discriminating contests with symmetric valuations, equilibrium payoffs are positive shares of the value of the prize. In contrast to a bargaining situation, players’ shares sum to less than one because a residual share of the value is lost due to rent dissipation. In this paper,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011550537

Do output-dependent prizes alleviate the sabotage problem in tournaments?

Glökler, Thomas; Pull, Kerstin; Stadler, Manfred - In: Games 13 (2022) 5, pp. 1-20

We investigate whether tournament prizes that depend on joint output ("variable prize tournaments") can alleviate the sabotage problem which is otherwise inherent in tournament struc- tures. In a game-theoretical model with three contestants, we compare fixed-prize tournaments with tournaments...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014418051

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