produce for the endogenous formation of an international counterterror coalition. We show that there are quite reasonable … counterterror coalition, holding the choices of all other nations as given. The incentives to join the coalition are the group …-specific benefits from retaliation enjoyed by each coalition member, the relatively lower spillover benefit from retaliation enjoyed by …

We consider three-sided coalition formation problems when each agent is concerned about his local status as measured by … the average rankings of the other types of groups. We show that a core stable coalition structure always exists, provided …

recursive core coalition structure may be either coarser or finer than the one that maximizes the social surplus. Moreover, the … general games, including non-superadditive games where the grand coalition does not form in equilibrium. We do not put any …

A set of coalition structures P is farsightedly stable (i) if all possible deviations from any coalition structure p … belonging to P to a coalition structure outside P are deterred by the threat of ending worse off or equally well off, (ii) if … there exists a farsighted improvingpath from any coalition structure outside the set leading to some coalition structure in …

This paper studies how to form an efficient coalition$da group of people. More specifically, we compare two mechanisms … for forming a coalition by running a laboratory experiment and reveal which mechanism leads to higher social surplus. In … who decide to join the meeting form a coalition and earn payoffs according to their actions and individual preferences. As …

central to a coalition; participants, i.e., those who are not actively engaged with the issues at hand; neutral actors, i ….e., non-members, those who are not party to any interests and outside the coalition. Using the language of networks, we … the role of participants as they facilitate or complicate extensions of a given coalition. Given the fixed network, we (1 …