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A note on the core of TU-cooperative games with multiple membership externalities

Nax, Heinrich H. - In: Games 5 (2014) 4, pp. 191-203

A generalization of transferable utility cooperative games from the functional forms introduced by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior) and Lucas and Thrall (1963, Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, 10, 281-298) is proposed to allow for multiple membership....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010422383

The refugee game : the relationship between individual security expenditures and collective security

Faria, João Ricardo; Novak, Andreas J.; Bagchi, Aniruddha - In: Games 11 (2020) 2/24, pp. 1-13

This paper studies a three player hierarchical differential game (with a large country, a small country, and a terrorist organization), to analyze the actual European refugee situation. Terrorists may enter Europe as refugees, taking advantage of the Open Door Policy, to attack both countries....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012431922

With potential games, which outcome is better?

Guisasola, Santiago; Saari, Donald - In: Games 11 (2020) 3/33, pp. 1-20

Lower one- or two-dimensional coordination, or potential games, are popularly used to model interactive behavior, such as innovation diffusion and cultural evolution. Typically, this involves determining the "better" of competing solutions. However, examples have demonstrated that different...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012432171

The loser's bliss in auctions with price externality

Haruvy, Ernan; Popkowski Leszczyc, Peter T. L. - In: Games 6 (2015) 3, pp. 191-213

We consider auctions with price externality where all bidders derive utility from the winning price, such as charity auctions. In addition to the benefit to the winning bidder, all bidders obtain a benefit that is increasing in the winning price. Theory makes two predictions in such settings:...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011316603

Bayesian social learning with local interactions

Guarino, Antonio; Ianni, Antonella - In: Games 1 (2010) 4, pp. 438-458

We study social learning in a large population of agents who only observe the actions taken by their neighbours. Agents have to choose one, out of two, reversible actions, each optimal in one, out of two, unknown states of the world. Each agent chooses rationally, on the basis of private...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009752451

Revenue implications of strategic and external auction risk

Robbett, Andrea; Graham, Michael K.; Matthews, Peter Hans - In: Games 7 (2016) 1, pp. 1-18

Two experimental treatments are used to study the effects of auction risk across five mechanisms. The first canonical, baseline treatment features only strategic risk and replicates the standard results that overbidding relative to the risk neutral Nash equilibrium is prevalent in all common...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011453209

Sharing a river with downstream externalities

Steinmann, Sarina; Winkler, Ralph - In: Games 10 (2019) 2/23, pp. 1-15

river in which net emissions accumulate and induce negative externalities to downstream riparians. Assuming a cooperative …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012061914

Network externalities and downstream collusion under asymmetric costs : a note

Lee, Jen Yao; Fan, Chen-Chia; Tsai, Chien-Shu - In: Games 14 (2023) 2, pp. 1-11

This paper considers the collusive stability of downstream competition in a vertical market with network externalities … perfect Nash equilibrium. We show that larger network externalities lead to less collusive incentive for an inefficient firm …, while for an efficient firm, this depends on the efficiency gap. An increase in network externalities will destabilize the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014422321

(Un)bounded rationality in decision making and game theory : back to square one?

Güth, Werner; Kliemt, Hartmut - In: Games 1 (2010) 1, pp. 53-65

Game and decision theory start from rather strong premises. Preferences, represented by utilities, beliefs represented by probabilities, common knowledge and symmetric rationality as background assumptions are treated as “given.” A richer language enabling us to capture the process leading...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009751382

A modal logic of epistemic games

Lorini, Emiliano; Schwarzentruber, François - In: Games 1 (2010) 4, pp. 478-526

We propose some variants of a multi-modal of joint action, preference and knowledge that support reasoning about epistemic games in strategic form. The first part of the paper deals with games with complete information. We first provide syntactic proofs of some well-known theorems in the area of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009752449

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