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Servátka, Maroš; Tucker, Steven James; Vadovič, Radovan - In: Games 2 (2011) 4, pp. 412-433

This paper reports an experiment evaluating the effect of gift giving on building trust. We have nested our explorations in the standard version of the investment game. Our gift treatment includes a dictator stage in which the trustee decides whether to give a gift to the trustor before both of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009752900

Is voting for a cartel a sign of cooperativeness?

Gillet, Joris - In: Games 12 (2021) 2, pp. 1-10

This paper tests the hypothesis that a (partial) reason why cartels - collective but costly and non-binding price agreements - lead to higher prices in a Bertrand oligopoly could be because of a selection effect: decision-makers who are willing to form price agreements are more likely to be less...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012547790

Do economists punish less?

Kaiser, Jonas Pilgaard; Pedersen, Kasper Selmar; Koch, … - In: Games 9 (2018) 4/75, pp. 1-17

A number of studies discuss whether and how economists differ from other disciplines in the amount that they contribute to public goods. We view this debate as incomplete because it neglects the willingness to sanction non-cooperative behavior, which is crucial for maintaining social order and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011905088

Feature-based choice and similarity perception in normal-form games : an experimental study

Di Guida, Sibilla; Devetag, Giovanna - In: Games 4 (2013) 4, pp. 776-794

In this paper, we claim that agents confronting with new interactive situations apply behavioral heuristics that drastically reduce the problem complexity either by neglecting the other players’ incentives, or by restricting attention to subsets of “salient” outcomes. We postulate that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010240816

The role of framing, inequity and history in a corruption game : some experimental evidence

Chaudhuri, Ananish; Paichayontvijit, Tirnud; Sbai, Erwann - In: Games 7 (2016) 2, pp. 1-24

history of past play has little effect on the level of corruption. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011515620

Cultural transmission and extortion

Ridinger, Garret - In: Games 9 (2018) 3/49, pp. 1-10

like Singapore and Hong Kong were able to greatly reduce corruption and suggests potential policy applications. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011891124

Trust and trustworthiness in corrupted economic environments

Becchetti, Leonardo; Corazzini, Luca; Pelligra, Vittorio - In: Games 12 (2021) 1/16, pp. 1-26

We use an original variant of the standard trust game to study the effects of corruption on trust and trustworthiness … presence of corruption, matched by a significant excess of reciprocity from the trustee. Both the trustor and the trustee … expect, on average, corruption to act as a tax, inelastic to changes in the probability of corruption prosecution …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012432604

Evolutionary inspection and corruption games

Katsikas, Stamatios; Kolokoltsov, Vassili; Yang, Wei - In: Games 7 (2016) 4, pp. 1-25

the corresponding version of a corruption game. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011550602

Strategic voting in heterogeneous electorates: an experimental study

Tyszler, Marcelo; Schram, Arthur - In: Games 4 (2013) 4, pp. 624-647

We study strategic voting in a setting where voters choose from three options and Condorcet cycles may occur. We introduce in the electorate heterogeneity in preference intensity by allowing voters to differ in the extent to which they value the three options. Three information conditions are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010240827

The impact of previous action on bargaining : an experiment on the emergence of preferences for fairness norms

Neumann, Thomas; Schosser, Stephan; Vogt, Bodo - In: Games 8 (2017) 3, pp. 1-9

The communication of participants to identify an acceptable bargaining outcome in the Nash bargaining game is all about fairness norms. Participants introduce fairness norms which yield a better outcome for themselves in order to convince the other participant of their bargaining proposal....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011709286

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