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Salience and strategy choice in 2 × 2 games

Leland, Jonathan W.; Schneider, Mark - In: Games 6 (2015) 4, pp. 521-559

We present a model of boundedly rational play in single-shot 2 × 2 games. Players choose strategies based on the perceived salience of their own payoffs and, if own-payoff salience is uninformative, on the perceived salience of their opponent's payoffs. When own payoffs are salient, the model's...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011383906

Imitation dynamics in oligopoly games with heterogeneous players

Lindeman, Daan; Ochea, Marius I. - In: Games 15 (2024) 2, pp. 1-26

the Cournot equilibrium is stabilized for market sizes for which it was unstable under Cournot homogeneous learning …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014636241

Estimating case-based learning

Guilfoos, Todd; Pape, Andreas D. - In: Games 11 (2020) 3/38, pp. 1-25

We propose a framework in order to econometrically estimate case-based learning and apply it to empirical data from … twelve 2 × 2 mixed strategy equilibria experiments. Case-based learning allows agents to explicitly incorporate information …-based learning to other learning models (reinforcement learning and self-tuned experience weighted attraction learning) while using …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012432206

The Monty Hall problem as a Bayesian game

Whitmeyer, Mark - In: Games 8 (2017) 3, pp. 1-21

This paper formulates the classic Monty Hall problem as a Bayesian game. Allowing Monty a small amount of freedom in his decisions facilitates a variety of solutions. The solution concept used is the Bayes Nash Equilibrium (BNE), and the set of BNE relies on Monty's motives and incentives. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011852697

The signaling value of punishing norm-breakers and rewarding norm-followers

Adriani, Fabrizio; Sonderegger, Silvia - In: Games 9 (2018) 4, pp. 1-32

We formally explore the idea that punishment of norm-breakers may be a vehicle for the older generation to teach youngsters about social norms. We show that this signaling role provides sufficient incentives to sustain costly punishing behavior. People punish norm-breakers to pass information...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012227745

Voting in three-alternative committees: An experiment

Goertz, Johanna M. M.; Chernomaz, Kirill - In: Games 10 (2019) 2, pp. 1-23

We design an experiment to test how voters vote in a small committee election with three alternatives. Voters have common preferences that depend on an unknown state of nature. Each voter receives an imprecise private signal prior to the election and then casts a vote. The alternative with the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012227765

A condorcet jury theorem for large poisson elections with multiple alternatives

Goertz, Johanna M. M. - In: Games 11 (2020) 1, pp. 1-12

Herein, we prove a Condorcet jury theorem (CJT) for large elections with multiple alternatives. Voters have common interests that depend on an unknown state of nature. Each voter receives an imprecise private signal about the state of nature and then submits one vote (simple plurality rule). We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012227796

Overconfidence and timing of entry

Santos-Pinto, Luis; Pires, Tiago - In: Games 11 (2020) 4, pp. 1-19

We analyze the impact of overconfidence on the timing of entry in markets, profits, and welfare using an extension of the quantity commitment game. Players have private information about costs, one player is overconfident, and the other one rational. We find that for slight levels of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013200042

An equilibrium analysis of Knaster's fair division procedure

Van Essen, Matt - In: Games 4 (2013) 1, pp. 21-37

In an incomplete information setting, we analyze the sealed bid auction proposed by Knaster (cf. Steinhaus (1948)). This procedure was designed to efficiently and fairly allocate multiple indivisible items when participants report their valuations truthfully. In equilibrium, players do not...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010369429

The impact of the irrelevant: Temporary buy-options and bidding behavior in auctions

Peeters, Ronald; Strobel, Martin; Vermeulen, Dries; … - In: Games 7 (2016) 1, pp. 1-19

With a laboratory experiment, we study the impact of buy-options and the corresponding buy-price on revenues and bidding behavior in (online) proxy-auctions with independent private valuations. We show that temporary buy-options may reduce revenues for two reasons: At low buy-prices, the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011709877

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