Economic agents are not always rational or farsighted and can make decisions according to simple behavioral rules that vary according to situation and can be studied using the tools of evolutionary game theory. Furthermore, such behavioral rules are themselves subject to evolutionary forces....

Economic agents are not always rational or farsighted and can make decisions according to simple behavioral rules that vary according to situation and can be studied using the tools of evolutionary game theory. Furthermore, such behavioral rules are themselves subject to evolutionary forces....

Agency may be exercised by different entities (e.g., individuals, firms, households). A given individual can form part of multiple agents (e.g., he may belong to a firm and a household). The set of agents that act in a given situation might not be common knowledge. We adapt the standard model of...

In this article, a class of mean-field-type games with discrete-continuous state spaces is considered. We establish Bellman systems which provide sufficiency conditions for mean-field-type equilibria in state-and-mean-field-type feedback form. We then derive unnormalized master adjoint systems...

In this article, a class of mean-field-type games with discrete-continuous state spaces is considered. We establish Bellman systems which provide sufficiency conditions for mean-field-type equilibria in state-and-mean-field-type feedback form. We then derive unnormalized master adjoint systems...