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Häfner, Samuel; Nöldeke, Georg - In: Games 7 (2016) 3, pp. 1-7

In imperfectly discriminating contests with symmetric valuations, equilibrium payoffs are positive shares of the value of the prize. In contrast to a bargaining situation, players' shares sum to less than one because a residual share of the value is lost due to rent dissipation. In this paper,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011709893

Payoff shares in two-player contests

Häfner, Samuel; Nöldeke, Georg - In: Games 7 (2016) 3, pp. 1-7

In imperfectly discriminating contests with symmetric valuations, equilibrium payoffs are positive shares of the value of the prize. In contrast to a bargaining situation, players’ shares sum to less than one because a residual share of the value is lost due to rent dissipation. In this paper,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011550537

Conflicts with momentum

Boudreau, James W.; Mathews, Timothy; Sanders, shane; … - In: Games 13 (2022) 1, pp. 1-12

advantage in the final stage. We examine such momentum in conflict scenarios and investigate how valuable it must be to avoid a …, rent dissipation in the two-stage conflict is equal across party whether or not an individual obtains first-stage momentum … as useful conflict benchmarks, they dissipate additional expected contest rents. This additional rent-dissipative toll …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013171901

Conflicts with momentum

Boudreau, James W.; Mathews, Timothy; Sanders, Shane; … - In: Games 13 (2022) 1, pp. 1-12

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013200169

Malevolent governance, intra-group conflict and the paradox of the plenty : an experiment

Puzon, Klarizze Anne; Willinger, Marc - In: Games 7 (2016) 1, pp. 1-11

-group conflict, i.e., the paradox of the plenty. We also consider the potential role of governance in avoiding this paradox. In the …-stage conflict. In the next stage, each group member allocates his private endowment between working or fighting for a share of the … resource size is higher. Group conflict (income) decreases (increases) only when leaders chose the strongest resource …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011453120

Malevolent governance, intra-group conflict and the paradox of the plenty: An experiment

Puzon, Klarizze Anne; Willinger, Marc - In: Games 7 (2016) 1, pp. 1-11

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011709873

Moral entitlements and aspiration formation in asymmetric bargaining: Experimental evidence from Germany and China

Hennig-Schmidt, Heike; Walkowitz, Gari - In: Games 8 (2017) 4, pp. 1-25

Using a unique experimental data set, we investigate how asymmetric legal rights shape bargainers' aspiration levels through moral entitlements derived from equity norms and number prominence. Aspiration formation is typically hard to observe in real life. Our study involves 15 negotiations from...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011852710

EU demand for defense, 1990-2019: A strategic spatial approach

George, Justin; Sandler, Todd - In: Games 12 (2021) 1, pp. 1-18

For 1990-2019, this study presents two-step GMM estimates of EU members' demands for defense spending based on alternative spatial-weight matrices. In particular, EU spatial connectivity is tied to EU membership status, members' contiguity, contiguity and power projection, inverse distance, and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013200075

Self-enforcing collective counterterror retaliation

Oliveira, André L.; Silva, Emilson C. D. - In: Games 13 (2022) 1, pp. 1-16

Motivated by recent examples of collective effort on the war on terror, we examine the incentives that retaliation may produce for the endogenous formation of an international counterterror coalition. We show that there are quite reasonable circumstances under which any nation that is a target...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013200158

A tale of two bargaining solutions

Karagözoğlu, Emin; Keskin, Kerim - In: Games 6 (2015) 2, pp. 161-174

We set up a rich bilateral bargaining model with four salient points (disagreement point, ideal point, reference point, and tempered aspirations point), where the disagreement point and the utility possibilities frontier are endogenously determined. This model allows us to compare two bargaining...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011709845