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Moral entitlements and aspiration formation in asymmetric bargaining: Experimental evidence from Germany and China
Hennig-Schmidt, Heike; Walkowitz, Gari - In: Games 8 (2017) 4, pp. 1-25
Using a unique experimental data set, we investigate how asymmetric legal rights shape bargainers' aspiration levels through moral entitlements derived from equity norms and number prominence. Aspiration formation is typically hard to observe in real life. Our study involves 15 negotiations from...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011852710
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Moral entitlements and aspiration formation in asymmetric bargaining : experimental evidence from Germany and China
Hennig-Schmidt, Heike; Walkowitz, Gari - In: Games 8 (2017) 4, pp. 1-25
Using a unique experimental data set, we investigate how asymmetric legal rights shape bargainers’ aspiration levels through moral entitlements derived from equity norms and number prominence. Aspiration formation is typically hard to observe in real life. Our study involves 15 negotiations...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011771180
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A tale of two bargaining solutions
Karagözoğlu, Emin; Keskin, Kerim - In: Games 6 (2015) 2, pp. 161-174
We set up a rich bilateral bargaining model with four salient points (disagreement point, ideal point, reference point … determined. This model allows us to compare two bargaining solutions that use reference points, the Gupta-Livne solution and the … solutions place on the disagreement point do not directly imply a unique efficiency ranking in this bargaining problem with a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011316643
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Conflicts with momentum
Boudreau, James W.; Mathews, Timothy; Sanders, shane; … - In: Games 13 (2022) 1, pp. 1-12
advantage in the final stage. We examine such momentum in conflict scenarios and investigate how valuable it must be to avoid a …, rent dissipation in the two-stage conflict is equal across party whether or not an individual obtains first-stage momentum … as useful conflict benchmarks, they dissipate additional expected contest rents. This additional rent-dissipative toll …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013171901
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Divorce costs and marital dissolution in a one-to-one matching framework with nontransferable utilities
Sağlam, İsmail - In: Games 4 (2013) 1, pp. 106-124
In this paper, we use a two-period one-to-one matching model with incomplete information to examine the effect of changes in divorce costs on marital dissolution. Each individual who has a nontransferable expected utility about the quality of each potential marriage decides whether to marry or...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009754874
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An experimental analysis of asymmetric power in conflict bargaining
Sieber, Katri; Clark, David; Holt, Charles A.; … - In: Games 4 (2013) 3, pp. 375-397
investigate the effects of power asymmetries on conflict rates in a two-stage bargaining game that is (if necessary) followed by …Demands and concessions in a multi-stage bargaining process are shaped by the probabilities that each side will prevail … on the table, but there is no conflict regardless of the degree of power asymmetry. Indeed, there is no delay in reaching …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009785364
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Conflicts with momentum
Boudreau, James W.; Mathews, Timothy; Sanders, Shane; … - In: Games 13 (2022) 1, pp. 1-12
advantage in the final stage. We examine such momentum in conflict scenarios and investigate how valuable it must be to avoid a …, rent dissipation in the two-stage conflict is equal across party whether or not an individual obtains first-stage momentum … as useful conflict benchmarks, they dissipate additional expected contest rents. This additional rent-dissipative toll …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013200169
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Divorce costs and marital dissolution in a one-to-one matching framework with nontransferable utilities
Saglam, Ismail - In: Games 4 (2013) 1, pp. 106-124
In this paper, we use a two-period one-to-one matching model with incomplete information to examine the effect of changes in divorce costs on marital dissolution. Each individual who has a nontransferable expected utility about the quality of each potential marriage decides whether to marry or...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010369422
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An Experimental Analysis of Asymmetric Power in Conflict Bargaining
Sieberg, Katri; Clark, David; Holt, Charles A.; … - In: Games 4 (2013) 3, pp. 375-397
investigate the effects of power asymmetries on conflict rates in a two-stage bargaining game that is (if necessary) followed by …Demands and concessions in a multi-stage bargaining process are shaped by the probabilities that each side will prevail … on the table, but there is no conflict regardless of the degree of power asymmetry. Indeed, there is no delay in reaching …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010684604
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An experimental analysis of asymmetric power in conflict bargaining
Sieber, Katri; Clark, David; Holt, Charles A.; … - In: Games 4 (2013) 3, pp. 375-397
investigate the effects of power asymmetries on conflict rates in a two-stage bargaining game that is (if necessary) followed by …Demands and concessions in a multi-stage bargaining process are shaped by the probabilities that each side will prevail … on the table, but there is no conflict regardless of the degree of power asymmetry. Indeed, there is no delay in reaching …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010369367