complementarity and how it is influenced by fairness concern and information transparency. We base our setup on a structured … value of the deal approximately half-half with the buyer as a normative fairness benchmark. The buyers, on the other hand …, did not have a demand for fairness that was based on a fairness benchmark. …

with unkind actions (negative reciprocity), while at the same time, it responds to kind behavior of rivals with kind … actions (positive reciprocity). We find that collusion is easier to sustain when firms have a concern for reciprocity towards … competing firms provided that they consider collusive prices to be kind and punishment prices to be unkind. Thus, reciprocity …

competition experiment. The two experiments use the same methods and subject pool, and examine games randomly selected from the … fairness. The probability of using the different rules is assumed to be stable over games. The estimated parameters imply that …

with unkind actions (negative reciprocity), while at the same time, it responds to kind behavior of rivals with kind … actions (positive reciprocity). We find that collusion is easier to sustain when firms have a concern for reciprocity towards … competing firms provided that they consider collusive prices to be kind and punishment prices to be unkind. Thus, reciprocity …

with unkind actions (negative reciprocity), while at the same time, it responds to kind behavior of rivals with kind … actions (positive reciprocity). We find that collusion is easier to sustain when firms have a concern for reciprocity towards … competing firms provided that they consider collusive prices to be kind and punishment prices to be unkind. Thus, reciprocity …

should only be rewarded for factors under their control. This fairness ideal does not hold subjects responsible for factors …

competition experiment. The two experiments use the same methods and subject pool, and examine games randomly selected from the … fairness. The probability of using the different rules is assumed to be stable over games. The estimated parameters imply that …

intended actions from the resulting outcomes. Equilibrium predictions from theoretical models of fairness are tested …