In many bargaining situations, the distribution of seats or voting weights does not accurately reflect bargaining power … at gender differences in bargaining behavior and in the effect of nominal weights. We find that women and men differ in …

We propose a bargaining process supergame over the strategies to play in a non-cooperative game. The agreement reached … by players at the end of the bargaining process is the strategy profile that they will play in the original non … existence, uniqueness, and efficiency of the agreement reachable through this bargaining process. We illustrate the consequences …

We propose a bargaining process supergame over the strategies to play in a non-cooperative game. The agreement reached … by players at the end of the bargaining process is the strategy profile that they will play in the original non … existence, uniqueness, and efficiency of the agreement reachable through this bargaining process. We illustrate the consequences …

We set up a rich bilateral bargaining model with four salient points (disagreement point, ideal point, reference point … determined. This model allows us to compare two bargaining solutions that use reference points, the Gupta-Livne solution and the … solutions place on the disagreement point do not directly imply a unique efficiency ranking in this bargaining problem with a …

We consider a multilateral bargaining game in which the agents can be classified into two groups according to their …

field concerning climate change dynamics. New results are obtained in the framework of competitive bargaining solutions and …

In many bargaining situations, the distribution of seats or voting weights does not accurately reflect bargaining power … at gender differences in bargaining behavior and in the effect of nominal weights. We find that women and men differ in …

This note reconsiders the Rubinstein bargaining game under the assumption that a rejected offer is only costly to the …