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Economic harmony : a rational theory of fairness and cooperation in strategic interactions

Suleiman, Ramzi - In: Games 13 (2022) 3, pp. 1-21

Experimental studies show that the Nash equilibrium and its refinements are poor predictors of behavior in non-cooperative strategic games. Cooperation models, such as ERC and inequality aversion, yield superior predictions compared to the standard game theory predictions. However, those models...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013252726

Watching eyes and living up to expectations : unkind, not kind, eyes increase first mover cooperation in a sequential prisoner’s dilemma

Pauwels, Loren; Declerck, Carolyn H.; Boone, Christophe - In: Games 8 (2017) 2, pp. 1-13

form expectations about the other player (first mover cooperation, trust) from the motive of greed (second mover … that unkind eyes urge first movers to live up to the interaction partner’s expectations. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011708375

Cournot's oligopoly equilibrium under different expectations and differentiated production

Grisáková, Nora; Štetka, Peter - In: Games 13 (2022) 6, pp. 1-17

firms. This article contains an oligopolistic model specifically designed for three different types of expectations, and has … games. An infinite time interval is considered here. Three types of future expectations were considered: a simple dynamic … model (or naïve expectations) in which the oligopolist assumes that its competitors will behave in the future based on their …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014418202

Watching eyes and living up to expectations: Unkind, not kind, eyes increase first mover cooperation in a sequential prisoner's dilemma

Pauwels, Loren; Declerck, Carolyn H.; Boone, Christophe - In: Games 8 (2017) 2, pp. 1-13

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011852686

(Un)bounded rationality in decision making and game theory : back to square one?

Güth, Werner; Kliemt, Hartmut - In: Games 1 (2010) 1, pp. 53-65

Game and decision theory start from rather strong premises. Preferences, represented by utilities, beliefs represented by probabilities, common knowledge and symmetric rationality as background assumptions are treated as “given.” A richer language enabling us to capture the process leading...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009751382

A modal logic of epistemic games

Lorini, Emiliano; Schwarzentruber, François - In: Games 1 (2010) 4, pp. 478-526

We propose some variants of a multi-modal of joint action, preference and knowledge that support reasoning about epistemic games in strategic form. The first part of the paper deals with games with complete information. We first provide syntactic proofs of some well-known theorems in the area of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009752449

Computer solution to the game of pure strategy

Rhoads, Glenn C.; Bartholdi, Laurent - In: Games 3 (2012) 3, pp. 150-156

We numerically solve the classical "Game of Pure Strategy" using linear programming. We notice an intricate even-odd behaviour in the results of our computations that seems to encourage odd or maximal bids.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009754113

The dynamics of costly signaling

Wagner, Elliott O. - In: Games 4 (2013) 2, pp. 163-181

Costly signaling is a mechanism through which the honesty of signals can be secured in equilibrium, even in interactions where communicators have conflicting interests. This paper explores the dynamics of one such signaling game: Spence’s model of education. It is found that separating...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009754763

External pressure on alliances : what does the prisoners’ dilemma reveal?

Binner, Jane M.; Fletcher, Leslie R.; Kolokoltsov, Vassili - In: Games 4 (2013) 4, pp. 754-775

Prompted by a real-life observation in the UK retail market, a two-player Prisoners’ Dilemma model of an alliance between two firms is adapted to include the response of a rival firm, resulting in a version of a three-player Prisoners’ Dilemma. We use this to analyse the impact on the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010240818

Schelling, von Neumann, and the event that didn’t occur

Field, Alexander James - In: Games 5 (2014) 1, pp. 53-89

Thomas Schelling was recognized by the Nobel Prize committee as a pioneer in the application of game theory and rational choice analysis to problems of politics and international relations. However, although he makes frequent references in his writings to this approach, his main explorations and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010338164

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