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Economic harmony : a rational theory of fairness and cooperation in strategic interactions

Suleiman, Ramzi - In: Games 13 (2022) 3, pp. 1-21

Experimental studies show that the Nash equilibrium and its refinements are poor predictors of behavior in non-cooperative strategic games. Cooperation models, such as ERC and inequality aversion, yield superior predictions compared to the standard game theory predictions. However, those models...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013252726

Cournot's oligopoly equilibrium under different expectations and differentiated production

Grisáková, Nora; Štetka, Peter - In: Games 13 (2022) 6, pp. 1-17

firms. This article contains an oligopolistic model specifically designed for three different types of expectations, and has … games. An infinite time interval is considered here. Three types of future expectations were considered: a simple dynamic … model (or naïve expectations) in which the oligopolist assumes that its competitors will behave in the future based on their …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014418202

Watching eyes and living up to expectations: Unkind, not kind, eyes increase first mover cooperation in a sequential prisoner's dilemma

Pauwels, Loren; Declerck, Carolyn H.; Boone, Christophe - In: Games 8 (2017) 2, pp. 1-13

form expectations about the other player (first mover cooperation, trust) from the motive of greed (second mover … that unkind eyes urge first movers to live up to the interaction partner's expectations. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011852686

Watching eyes and living up to expectations : unkind, not kind, eyes increase first mover cooperation in a sequential prisoner’s dilemma

Pauwels, Loren; Declerck, Carolyn H.; Boone, Christophe - In: Games 8 (2017) 2, pp. 1-13

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011708375

Border games : a game theoretic model of undocumented immigration

Yazar, Julide; Gitter, Robert J. - In: Games 14 (2023) 5, pp. 1-19

We consider a game-theoretic model of undocumented immigration with the aim of emphasizing the strategic interaction between the different forces affecting the issue. Specifically, we analyze the strategic interaction between firms in the destination country, native labor, the elected officials...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014426507

A review of attacker-defender games and cyber security

Hausken, Kjell; Welburn, Jonathan William; Zhuang, Jun - In: Games 15 (2024) 4, pp. 1-27

The focus of this review is the long and broad history of attacker-defender games as a foundation for the narrower and shorter history of cyber security. The purpose is to illustrate the role of game theory in cyber security and which areas have received attention and to indicate future research...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015271344

Simulation of the Stackelberg-Hotelling game

Garcia-Perez, Luis; Grau-Climent, Juan; Losada, Juan C.; … - In: Games 15 (2024) 5, pp. 1-25

This work studies the Hotelling game with sequential choice of prices, that is, the Stackelberg-Hotelling (SHOT) game. The game is studied through numerical simulation, which provides the subgame perfect equilibrium solution not only in the unrestricted game but also in the game with reservation...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015271373

Schelling, von Neumann, and the event that didn’t occur

Field, Alexander James - In: Games 5 (2014) 1, pp. 53-89

Thomas Schelling was recognized by the Nobel Prize committee as a pioneer in the application of game theory and rational choice analysis to problems of politics and international relations. However, although he makes frequent references in his writings to this approach, his main explorations and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010338164

Introducing disappointment dynamics and comparing behaviors in evolutionary games : some simulation results

Patokos, Tassos - In: Games 5 (2014) 1, pp. 1-25

The paper presents an evolutionary model, based on the assumption that agents may revise their current strategies if they previously failed to attain the maximum level of potential payoffs. We offer three versions of this reflexive mechanism, each one of which describes a distinct type:...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010338167

External pressure on alliances : what does the prisoners’ dilemma reveal?

Binner, Jane M.; Fletcher, Leslie R.; Kolokoltsov, Vassili - In: Games 4 (2013) 4, pp. 754-775

Prompted by a real-life observation in the UK retail market, a two-player Prisoners’ Dilemma model of an alliance between two firms is adapted to include the response of a rival firm, resulting in a version of a three-player Prisoners’ Dilemma. We use this to analyse the impact on the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010240818