in terms of evolutionary game theory. Based on the dilemmatic donation game, we introduce a strategy of commitment to … both cooperation and peer punishment. To make the commitment credible, we assume that those willing to commit have to make … punish free riders and non-committers. It turns out that the deposit-based commitment offers both the efficiency of peer …

We use experimental methods to investigate whether pledges of commitment can improve cooperation in endogenously … findings show that pledges of commitment alone can increase cooperation and welfare in committed partnerships. The introduction … partnerships fall solely on the individual choosing to break up, pledges of commitment fail to improve cooperation and welfare. …

We use experimental methods to investigate whether pledges of commitment can improve cooperation in endogenously … findings show that pledges of commitment alone can increase cooperation and welfare in committed partnerships. The introduction … partnerships fall solely on the individual choosing to break up, pledges of commitment fail to improve cooperation and welfare. …

in terms of evolutionary game theory. Based on the dilemmatic donation game, we introduce a strategy of commitment to … both cooperation and peer punishment. To make the commitment credible, we assume that those willing to commit have to make … punish free riders and non-committers. It turns out that the deposit-based commitment offers both the efficiency of peer …

an incentive to use cross-commitment devices to reduce the likelihood of spillover welfare losses. The paper also shows … that cross commitment devices that target immediate payoffs dominate cross-commitments that target delayed payoffs. Finally …