We analyze the space of deterministic, dominant-strategy incentive compatible, individually rational and Pareto optimal combinatorial auctions. We examine a model with multidimensional types, nonidentical items, private values and quasilinear preferences for the players with one relaxation; the...

We auction scarce rights to play the Proposer and Responder positions in ultimatum games. As a control treatment, we randomly allocate these rights and charge exogenous participation fees. These participation fee sequences match the auction price sequence from a session of the original...

We study the structure of the rest points of signaling games and their dynamic behavior under selection-mutation dynamics by taking the case of three signals as our canonical example. Many rest points of the replicator dynamics of signaling games are not isolated and, therefore, not robust under...

Agents involved in a conflicting claims problem may be concerned with the proportion of their claims that is satisfied, or with the total amount they get. In order to relate both perspectives, we associate to each conflicting claims problem a bargaining-in-proportions set. Then, we obtain a...

The editors of <i>Games</i> would like to express their sincere gratitude to the following reviewers for assessing manuscripts in 2014:[...]

This study investigates the relationship between an actor’s beliefs about others’ other-regarding (social) preferences and her own other-regarding preferences, using an<em> “avant-garde”</em> hierarchical Bayesian method. We estimate two distributional other-regarding preference parameters, α...

We experimentally investigate whether human subjects are willing to give up individual freedom in return for the benefits of improved coordination. We conduct a modified iterated public goods game in which subjects in each period first decide which of two groups to join. One group employs a...

This paper analyzes optimal contracts in a linear hidden-action model with normally distributed returns possessing two moments that are governed jointly by two agents who have negative exponential utilities. They can observe and verify each others’ effort levels and draft enforceable...

This paper attacks a problem like the one addressed in an earlier work (Potthoff, 2013) but is more mathematical. The setting is one where an election is to choose a single winner from <i>m</i> ( 2) candidates, it is postulated that voters have knowledge of the preference profile of the electorate, and...

Our study analyzes theories of learning for strategic interactions in networks. Participants played two of the 2 × 2 games used by Selten and Chmura [1]. Every participant played against four neighbors. As a distinct aspect our experimental design allows players to choose different strategies...