together rather than investing separately. We study the coordination and cooperation problems that might hinder successful … collaboration in a dynamic network setting. We develop an experiment in which coordination problems are mainly due to finding … collaborate. The results show that as costs of forming links increase, groups succeed less often in solving the coordination …

This paper experimentally investigates free-riding behavior on communication cost in a coordination game and finds …

We consider an evolutionary model of social coordination in a 2 × 2 game where two groups of players prefer to … the cost favor coordination. Indeed, when the cost is low, in inside-group interactions, players always coordinate on …

presenting an overview of the literature that shows various coordination mechanisms but no backup agreement proposals for supply … chain coordination, this paper develops a decentralized three-echelon supply chain facing stochastic customer demand and … includes the backup agreement as a coordination mechanism to guarantee a balanced relationship between the chain members. The …

on the table, but there is no conflict regardless of the degree of power asymmetry. Indeed, there is no delay in reaching … an agreement that incorporates the (unrealized) costs of delay and conflict. A laboratory experiment has been used to … investigate the effects of power asymmetries on conflict rates in a two-stage bargaining game that is (if necessary) followed by …

-group conflict, i.e., the paradox of the plenty. We also consider the potential role of governance in avoiding this paradox. In the …-stage conflict. In the next stage, each group member allocates his private endowment between working or fighting for a share of the … resource size is higher. Group conflict (income) decreases (increases) only when leaders chose the strongest resource …

advantage in the final stage. We examine such momentum in conflict scenarios and investigate how valuable it must be to avoid a …, rent dissipation in the two-stage conflict is equal across party whether or not an individual obtains first-stage momentum … as useful conflict benchmarks, they dissipate additional expected contest rents. This additional rent-dissipative toll …

A game-theoretic model of repeated interaction between two potential adversaries is analyzed to illustrate how conflict … players. During each period, each adversary must decide to either stage an attack or not. Conflict ensues if either player … period of tranquility. When this happens, it is as if conflict has suddenly arisen without any apparent cause or impetus …