Is the willingness to make trades influenced by how the total gains from trade are split between the trading partners? We present results from a bilateral trade game (n = 128) where all participants were price-takers and trading pairs faced one of three exogenously imposed trading prices. The...

Using a unique experimental data set, we investigate how asymmetric legal rights shape bargainers’ aspiration levels through moral entitlements derived from equity norms and number prominence. Aspiration formation is typically hard to observe in real life. Our study involves 15 negotiations...

This paper departs from the standard profit-maximizing model of firm behavior by assuming that firms are motivated in part by personal animosity–or respect–towards their competitors. A reciprocal firm responds to unkind behavior of rivals with unkind actions (negative reciprocity), while at...

We expand upon the previous models of inequity aversion of Fehr and Schmidt [1], and Frohlich et al. [2], which assume that dictators get disutility if the final allocation of surplus deviates from the equal split (egalitarian principle) or from the subjects' production (libertarian principle)....

Two deviations of alternating-offer bargaining behavior from economic theory are observed together, yet have been studied separately. Players who could secure themselves a large surplus share if bargainers were purely self-interested incompletely exploit their advantage. Delay in agreement...

This article explains the emergence of an unique equilibrium resolution as the result of a compromise between two selves with different preferences. The stronger this difference is, the more generous the resolution gets. This result is in contrast to predictions of other models in which sinful...

This article explains the emergence of an unique equilibrium resolution as the result of a compromise between two selves with different preferences. The stronger this difference is, the more generous the resolution gets. This result is in contrast to predictions of other models in which sinful...

This article explains the emergence of an unique equilibrium resolution as the result of a compromise between two selves with different preferences. The stronger this difference is, the more generous the resolution gets. This result is in contrast to predictions of other models in which sinful...

Agents involved in a conflicting claims problem may be concerned with the proportion of their claims that is satisfied, or with the total amount they get. In order to relate both perspectives, we associate to each conflicting claims problem a bargaining-in-proportions set. Then, we obtain a...

We set up a rich bilateral bargaining model with four salient points (disagreement point, ideal point, reference point, and tempered aspirations point), where the disagreement point and the utility possibilities frontier are endogenously determined. This model allows us to compare two bargaining...