We present a model where each of two players chooses between remuneration based on either private or team effort. Although at least one of the players has the equilibrium strategy to choose private remuneration, we frequently observe both players to choose team remuneration in a series of...

We present a model where each of two players chooses between remuneration based on either private or team effort. Although at least one of the players has the equilibrium strategy to choose private remuneration, we frequently observe both players to choose team remuneration in a series of...

We experimentally investigated the effects of the possibility of taking in the dictator game and the choices of passive players between the dictator game and the taking game on the distribution decisions of active players. Our main findings support our hypothesis: when the dictator game is not...

This paper reports an experiment evaluating the effect of gift giving on building trust. We have nested our explorations in the standard version of the investment game. Our gift treatment includes a dictator stage in which the trustee decides whether to give a gift to the trustor before both of...

This paper tests the hypothesis that a (partial) reason why cartels - collective but costly and non-binding price agreements - lead to higher prices in a Bertrand oligopoly could be because of a selection effect: decision-makers who are willing to form price agreements are more likely to be less...

A number of studies discuss whether and how economists differ from other disciplines in the amount that they contribute to public goods. We view this debate as incomplete because it neglects the willingness to sanction non-cooperative behavior, which is crucial for maintaining social order and...

Individuals face competitive environments daily, and it is important to understand how emotions affect behavior in these environments and resulting economic consequences. Using a two-stage laboratory experiment, I analyze the role of reported emotions in tournament performance and assess how the...

In experimental games, task-related incentives are payments to experimental subjects that vary according to their strategy choices and the consequent outcomes of the games. Limited evidence exists regarding incentive magnitude effects in experimental games. We examined one-off strategy choices...

Many companies try to access personal information to discriminate among consumers. We analyse how privacy regulations affect the acquisition and disclosure of information in a simple game of persuasion. Theory predicts that no data will be acquired with Disclosure Duty of collected data whereas...

We experimentally analyze a lemons market with a labor-market framing. Sellers are referred to as 'workers' and have the possibility to provide 'employers' with costly but credible information about their 'productivity'. Economic theory suggests that in this setup, unraveling takes place and a...