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Conditional cooperation and the marginal per capita return in public good games

Cartwright, Edward J.; Lovett, Denise - In: Games 5 (2014) 4, pp. 234-256

We investigate experimentally whether the extent of conditional cooperation in public good games depends on the marginal per capita return (MPCR) to the public good and type of game. The MPCR is varied from 0.2 to 0.4 to 0.8. The "standard" game, in which three players contribute before a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011709837

Conditional cooperation and the marginal per capita return in public good games

Cartwright, Edward; Lovett, Denise - In: Games 5 (2014) 4, pp. 234-256

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010503532

Tacit collusion under fairness and reciprocity

çIriðs, Doruk; Santos-Pinto, Luís - In: Games 4 (2013) 1, pp. 50-65

with unkind actions (negative reciprocity), while at the same time, it responds to kind behavior of rivals with kind … actions (positive reciprocity). We find that collusion is easier to sustain when firms have a concern for reciprocity towards … competing firms provided that they consider collusive prices to be kind and punishment prices to be unkind. Thus, reciprocity …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010369365

Tacit collusion under fairness and reciprocity

İriş, Doruk; Santos-Pinto, Luís - In: Games 4 (2013) 1, pp. 50-65

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009753710

The price of anarchy for network formation in an adversary model

Kliemann, Lasse - In: Games 2 (2011) 3, pp. 302-332

We study network formation with n players and link cost » 0. After the network is built, an adversary randomly deletes one link according to a certain probability distribution. Cost for player ν incorporates the expected number of players to which ν will become disconnected. We focus on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010369340

Voluntary versus enforced team effort

Keser, Claudia; Montmarquette, Claude - In: Games 2 (2011) 3, pp. 277-301

We present a model where each of two players chooses between remuneration based on either private or team effort. Although at least one of the players has the equilibrium strategy to choose private remuneration, we frequently observe both players to choose team remuneration in a series of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010369350

Students, temporary workers and co-op workers: An experimental investigation on social preferences

Dragone, Davide; Galeotti, Fabio; Orsini, Raimondello - In: Games 6 (2015) 2, pp. 79-123

We conduct an artefactual field experiment to compare the individual preferences and propensity to cooperate of three pools of subjects: Undergraduate students, temporary workers and permanent workers. We find that students are more selfish and contribute less than workers. Temporary and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011709842

Should law keep pace with society? Relative update rates determine the co-evolution of institutional punishment and citizen contributions to public goods

Roithmayr, Daria; Isakov, Alexander; Rand, David - In: Games 6 (2015) 2, pp. 124-149

Until recently, theorists considering the evolution of human cooperation have paid little attention to institutional punishment, a defining feature of large-scale human societies. Compared to individually-administered punishment, institutional punishment offers a unique potential advantage: the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011709843

Stable sampling equilibrium in common pool resource games

Camilo Cárdenas, Juan; Mantilla, César; Sethi, Rajiv - In: Games 6 (2015) 3, pp. 299-317

This paper reconsiders evidence from experimental common pool resource games from the perspective of a model of payoff sampling. Despite being parameter-free, the model is able to replicate some striking features of the data, including single-peaked frequency distributions, the persistent use of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011709853

Framing and feedback in social dilemmas with partners and strangers

Cox, Caleb A.; Stoddard, Brock - In: Games 6 (2015) 4, pp. 394-412

We study framing effects in repeated social dilemmas by comparing payoff-equivalent Give- and Take-framed public goods games under varying matching mechanisms (Partners or Strangers) and levels of feedback (Aggregate or Individual). In the Give-framed game, players contribute to a public good,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011709858