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Conditional cooperation and the marginal per capita return in public good games
Cartwright, Edward J.; Lovett, Denise - In: Games 5 (2014) 4, pp. 234-256
We investigate experimentally whether the extent of conditional cooperation in public good games depends on the marginal per capita return (MPCR) to the public good and type of game. The MPCR is varied from 0.2 to 0.4 to 0.8. The "standard" game, in which three players contribute before a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011709837
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Conditional cooperation and the marginal per capita return in public good games
Cartwright, Edward; Lovett, Denise - In: Games 5 (2014) 4, pp. 234-256
We investigate experimentally whether the extent of conditional cooperation in public good games depends on the marginal per capita return (MPCR) to the public good and type of game. The MPCR is varied from 0.2 to 0.4 to 0.8. The "standard" game, in which three players contribute before a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010503532
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Tacit collusion under fairness and reciprocity
çIriðs, Doruk; Santos-Pinto, Luís - In: Games 4 (2013) 1, pp. 50-65
with unkind actions (negative reciprocity), while at the same time, it responds to kind behavior of rivals with kind … actions (positive reciprocity). We find that collusion is easier to sustain when firms have a concern for reciprocity towards … competing firms provided that they consider collusive prices to be kind and punishment prices to be unkind. Thus, reciprocity …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010369365
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Tacit collusion under fairness and reciprocity
İriş, Doruk; Santos-Pinto, Luís - In: Games 4 (2013) 1, pp. 50-65
with unkind actions (negative reciprocity), while at the same time, it responds to kind behavior of rivals with kind … actions (positive reciprocity). We find that collusion is easier to sustain when firms have a concern for reciprocity towards … competing firms provided that they consider collusive prices to be kind and punishment prices to be unkind. Thus, reciprocity …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009753710
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Public-goods games with endogenous institution-formation: Experimental evidence on the effect of the voting rule
Funaki, Yukihiko; Li, Jiawen; Veszteg, Róbert F. - In: Games 8 (2017) 4, pp. 1-22
We report experimental results on voluntary contributions to public-goods provision from situations in which parties can create institutions to impose a certain contribution level on its members. We focus on a public-goods game where the joint decisions inside the institution are made based on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011852718
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To tender or not to tender? Deliberate and exogenous sunk costs in a public good game
Heine, Florian; Sefton, Martin - In: Games 9 (2018) 3, pp. 1-28
In an experimental study, we compare individual willingness to cooperate in a public good game after an initial team contest phase. While players in the treatment setup make a conscious decision on how much to invest in the contest, this decision is exogenously imposed on players in the control...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012227697
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Dynamic contributions to a public project: The impact of rising marginal benefit and completion benefits
Baker, Ronald J.; Halloran, Matthew - In: Games 9 (2018) 3, pp. 1-19
Many public projects are funded in a dynamic manner in which contributors are able to make gradual increases in contributions and condition additional contributions on the cooperation of others. This study presents results from experiments in which subjects with an initial fixed endowment make...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012227699
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Prescriptive norms and social comparisons
Michaeli, Moti; Spiro, Daniel - In: Games 9 (2019) 4, pp. 1-12
This paper analyzes the equilibrium strength of prescriptive norms to contribute to public goods. We consider three methods of establishing what an acceptable contribution to the public good is. Under the first method, the contribution of the bottom contributor is the reference point by which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012227740
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Thankful or thankless: Does the past's altruism increase the present's public good contributions?
Abatayo, Anna Lou; Svenningsen, Lea Skræp; Thorsen, Bo … - In: Games 11 (2020) 1, pp. 1-29
Two important aspects of global environmental problems are that (1) the actions of past generations affect the opportunities of the present, and (2) both in the past and the present generations, collaboration across different countries is needed to provide global public goods. In this paper, we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012227800
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EU demand for defense, 1990-2019: A strategic spatial approach
George, Justin; Sandler, Todd - In: Games 12 (2021) 1, pp. 1-18
For 1990-2019, this study presents two-step GMM estimates of EU members' demands for defense spending based on alternative spatial-weight matrices. In particular, EU spatial connectivity is tied to EU membership status, members' contiguity, contiguity and power projection, inverse distance, and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013200075