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Taxation with mobile high-income agents : experimental evidence on tax compliance and equity perceptions
Casal, Sandro; Grimm, Veronika; Schächtele, Simeon - In: Games 10 (2019) 4/42, pp. 1-29
In a laboratory experiment on tax compliance, we model a situation in which high-income taxpayers can leave a tax …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012167860
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The role of framing, inequity and history in a corruption game : some experimental evidence
Chaudhuri, Ananish; Paichayontvijit, Tirnud; Sbai, Erwann - In: Games 7 (2016) 2, pp. 1-24
We investigate the role of framing, inequity in initial endowments and history in shaping behavior in a corrupt transaction by extending the one-shot bribery game introduced by Cameron et al. (2009) to a repeated game setting. We find that the use of loaded language significantly reduces the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011515620
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Taxation with mobile high-income agents: Experimental evidence on tax compliance and equity perceptions
Casal, Sandro; Grimm, Veronika; Schächtele, Simeon - In: Games 10 (2019) 4, pp. 1-29
In a laboratory experiment on tax compliance, we model a situation in which high-income taxpayers can leave a tax …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012227787
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The role of framing, inequity and history in a corruption game: Some experimental evidence
Chaudhuri, Ananish; Paichayontvijit, Tirnud; Sbai, Erwann - In: Games 7 (2016) 2, pp. 1-24
We investigate the role of framing, inequity in initial endowments and history in shaping behavior in a corrupt transaction by extending the one-shot bribery game introduced by Cameron et al. (2009) to a repeated game setting. We find that the use of loaded language significantly reduces the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011709882
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To tender or not to tender? : deliberate and exogenous sunk costs in a public good game
Heine, Florian; Sefton, Martin - In: Games 9 (2018) 3/41, pp. 1-28
contest phase. While players in the treatment setup make a conscious decision on how much to invest in the contest, this … especially for groups on the losing side of the contest: Given the same level of sunk costs, contributions to the public good are … lower for groups which failed to be successful in the preceding between-group contest. Furthermore, this detrimental effect …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011891197
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Bimodal bidding in experimental all-pay auctions
Ernst, Christiane; Thöni, Christian - In: Games 4 (2013) 4, pp. 608-623
We report results from experimental first-price, sealed-bid, all-pay auctions for a good with a common and known value. We observe bidding strategies in groups of two and three bidders and under two extreme information conditions. As predicted by the Nash equilibrium, subjects use mixed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010240829
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An experimental study of self-enforcing coalitions
Jandoc, Karl Robert L.; Juarez, Ruben - In: Games 10 (2019) 3/31, pp. 1-32
conduct an economic experiment using this model to investigate possible behavioral factors that may explain deviations from …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012062323
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Gender differences in the response to decision power and responsibility : framing effects in a dictator game
Bruttel, Lisa Verena; Stolley, Florian - In: Games 9 (2018) 2/28, pp. 1-16
This paper studies the effects of two different frames on decisions in a dictator game. Before making their allocation decision, dictators read a short text. Depending on the treatment, the text either emphasizes their decision power and freedom of choice or it stresses their responsibility for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011849527
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Anticipated communication in the ultimatum game
Capizzani, Mario; Mittone, Luigi; Musau, Andrew; … - In: Games 8 (2017) 3, pp. 1-20
Anticipated verbal feedback in a dictator game has been shown to induce altruistic behavior. However, in the ultimatum game which, apart from generosity, entails a strategic component since a proposer may (rightly) fear that the responder will reject a low offer, it remains an open question...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011709209
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To tender or not to tender? Deliberate and exogenous sunk costs in a public good game
Heine, Florian; Sefton, Martin - In: Games 9 (2018) 3, pp. 1-28
contest phase. While players in the treatment setup make a conscious decision on how much to invest in the contest, this … especially for groups on the losing side of the contest: Given the same level of sunk costs, contributions to the public good are … lower for groups which failed to be successful in the preceding between-group contest. Furthermore, this detrimental effect …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012227697