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Is voting for a cartel a sign of cooperativeness?

Gillet, Joris - In: Games 12 (2021) 2, pp. 1-10

This paper tests the hypothesis that a (partial) reason why cartels - collective but costly and non-binding price agreements - lead to higher prices in a Bertrand oligopoly could be because of a selection effect: decision-makers who are willing to form price agreements are more likely to be less...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012547790

Tacit collusion under fairness and reciprocity

İriş, Doruk; Santos-Pinto, Luís - In: Games 4 (2013) 1, pp. 50-65

This paper departs from the standard profit-maximizing model of firm behavior by assuming that firms are motivated in part by personal animosity–or respect–towards their competitors. A reciprocal firm responds to unkind behavior of rivals with unkind actions (negative reciprocity), while at...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009753710

Simple voting games and cartel damage proportioning

Napel, Stefan; Welter, Dominik - In: Games 12 (2021) 4, pp. 1-18

Individual contributions by infringing firms to the compensation of cartel victims must reflect their “relative responsibility for the harm caused” according to EU legislation. Several studies have argued that the theoretically best way to operationalize this norm is to apply the Shapley...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012649687

Price and quantity competition under vertical pricing

Basak, Debasmita - In: Games 14 (2023) 4, pp. 1-8

We consider a vertically related market where one quantity-setting and another price-setting downstream firm negotiate the terms of a two-part tariff contract with an upstream input supplier. In contrast to the traditional belief, we show that the price-setting firm produces a higher output and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014426325

Information sharing in oligopoly : sharing groups and core-periphery architectures

Currarini, Sergio; Feri, Francesco - In: Games 12 (2021) 4, pp. 1-17

The trade-off between the costs and benefits of disclosing a firm's private information has been the object of a vast literature. The absence of incentives to share information on a common market demand prior to competition has been advocated to interpret information sharing as evidence of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013171765

Oligopoly pricing : the role of firm size and number

Bos, Iwan; Marini, Marco - In: Games 14 (2023) 1, pp. 1-16

This paper examines a homogeneous-good Bertrand-Edgeworth oligopoly model to explore the role of firm size and number in pricing. We consider the price impact of merger, break up, investment, divestment, entry and exit. A merger leads to higher prices only when it increases the size of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014420154

Collusive stability with relative performance and network externalities

Lu, Yi-Shan; Tsai, Chien-Shu; Lee, Jen Yao; Lee, Chung-Yang - In: Games 15 (2024) 23, pp. 1-7

In this paper, we aim to investigate the collusive stability in the presence of network externalities among firms with relative performance in the firm's objective functions. We demonstrate that collusive stability is increasing (decreasing) in the degree of relative performance, product...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014636244

Stackelberg social equilibrium in water markets

Houba, Harold; Tomori, Françeska - In: Games 14 (2023) 4, pp. 1-9

Market power in water markets can be modeled as simultaneous quantity competition on a river structure and analyzed by applying social equilibrium. In an example of a duopoly water market, we argue that the lack of backward induction logic implies that the upstream supplier foregoes profitable...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014426327

Imitation dynamics in oligopoly games with heterogeneous players

Lindeman, Daan; Ochea, Marius I. - In: Games 15 (2024) 2, pp. 1-26

We investigate the role and performance of imitative behavior in a class of quantity-setting, Cournot games. Within a … heuristic (Cournot best-response) and the stable one (imitation) and on the intensity of the evolutionary pressure. When this … cost differential is positive (i.e., imitation is relatively cheaper vis a vis Cournot), most firms use this heuristic and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014636241

A game-theoretic model of strategic interaction using advertising : simulating the evolution of the Cournot Nash equilibrium under different competitive scenarios

Brady, Malcolm - In: Games 12 (2021) 4, pp. 1-16

advertising. The paper simulates the strategic interaction of the two firms based on a game-theoretic Cournot analytical model …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012698096

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