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Moral entitlements and aspiration formation in asymmetric bargaining: Experimental evidence from Germany and China
Hennig-Schmidt, Heike; Walkowitz, Gari - In: Games 8 (2017) 4, pp. 1-25
Using a unique experimental data set, we investigate how asymmetric legal rights shape bargainers' aspiration levels through moral entitlements derived from equity norms and number prominence. Aspiration formation is typically hard to observe in real life. Our study involves 15 negotiations from...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011852710
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A tale of two bargaining solutions
Karagözoğlu, Emin; Keskin, Kerim - In: Games 6 (2015) 2, pp. 161-174
We set up a rich bilateral bargaining model with four salient points (disagreement point, ideal point, reference point … determined. This model allows us to compare two bargaining solutions that use reference points, the Gupta-Livne solution and the … solutions place on the disagreement point do not directly imply a unique efficiency ranking in this bargaining problem with a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011316643
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Moral entitlements and aspiration formation in asymmetric bargaining : experimental evidence from Germany and China
Hennig-Schmidt, Heike; Walkowitz, Gari - In: Games 8 (2017) 4, pp. 1-25
Using a unique experimental data set, we investigate how asymmetric legal rights shape bargainers’ aspiration levels through moral entitlements derived from equity norms and number prominence. Aspiration formation is typically hard to observe in real life. Our study involves 15 negotiations...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011771180
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Takeovers, freezeouts, and risk arbitrage
Gomes, Armando R. - In: Games 15 (2024) 1, pp. 1-27
This paper develops a dynamic model of tender offers in which there is trading on the target's shares during the takeover, and bidders can freeze out target shareholders (compulsorily acquire remaining shares not tendered at the bid price), features that prevail on almost all takeovers. We show...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014480797
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A tale of two bargaining solutions
Karagözoğlu, Emin; Keskin, Kerim - In: Games 6 (2015) 2, pp. 161-174
We set up a rich bilateral bargaining model with four salient points (disagreement point, ideal point, reference point … determined. This model allows us to compare two bargaining solutions that use reference points, the Gupta-Livne solution and the … solutions place on the disagreement point do not directly imply a unique efficiency ranking in this bargaining problem with a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011709845
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An equilibrium analysis of Knaster's fair division procedure
Van Essen, Matt - In: Games 4 (2013) 1, pp. 21-37
In an incomplete information setting, we analyze the sealed bid auction proposed by Knaster (cf. Steinhaus (1948)). This procedure was designed to efficiently and fairly allocate multiple indivisible items when participants report their valuations truthfully. In equilibrium, players do not...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010369429
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An equilibrium analysis of Knaster’s fair division procedure
Van Essen, Matthew - In: Games 4 (2013) 1, pp. 21-37
In an incomplete information setting, we analyze the sealed bid auction proposed by Knaster (cf. Steinhaus (1948)). This procedure was designed to efficiently and fairly allocate multiple indivisible items when participants report their valuations truthfully. In equilibrium, players do not...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009753712
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Informational hold up and intermediaries
Utgoff, Naomi - In: Games 13 (2022) 5, pp. 1-14
Why do some incomplete information markets feature intermediaries while others do not? I study the allocation of two goods in an incomplete information setting with a single principal, multiple agents with unit demand, and interdependent valuations. I construct a novel dynamic mechanism...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014418049
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Divorce costs and marital dissolution in a one-to-one matching framework with nontransferable utilities
Sağlam, İsmail - In: Games 4 (2013) 1, pp. 106-124
In this paper, we use a two-period one-to-one matching model with incomplete information to examine the effect of changes in divorce costs on marital dissolution. Each individual who has a nontransferable expected utility about the quality of each potential marriage decides whether to marry or...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009754874
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Conflicts with momentum
Boudreau, James W.; Mathews, Timothy; Sanders, shane; … - In: Games 13 (2022) 1, pp. 1-12
advantage in the final stage. We examine such momentum in conflict scenarios and investigate how valuable it must be to avoid a …, rent dissipation in the two-stage conflict is equal across party whether or not an individual obtains first-stage momentum … as useful conflict benchmarks, they dissipate additional expected contest rents. This additional rent-dissipative toll …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013171901