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Incomplete Information about Social Preferences Explains Equal Division and Delay in Bargaining
Kohler, Stefan - In: Games 3 (2012) 3, pp. 119-137
-interest or envy, of one bargaining party as private information in a three period game of bargaining and preference screening and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010603731
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Responder Feelings in a Three-Player Three-Option Ultimatum Game: Affective Determinants of Rejection Behavior
Pfister, Hans-Rüdiger; Böhm, Gisela - In: Games 3 (2012) 1, pp. 1-29
emotional mechanisms have been proposed as a possible explanation. In particular, feelings of fairness, anger and envy are … driven by feelings of envy towards a third party. Results from two experiments suggest that responders experience feelings of … towards the proposer. Responders also experience dissatisfaction and envy when third party shares exceed their own shares …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009646375
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Incomplete information about social preferences explains equal division and delay in bargaining
Kohler, Stefan - In: Games 3 (2012) 3, pp. 119-137
-interest or envy, of one bargaining party as private information in a three period game of bargaining and preference screening and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009754119
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Intention or request : the impact of message structures
Wang, Siyu; Flannery, Timothy - In: Games 12 (2021) 1/12, pp. 1-13
This paper investigates how different message structures impact communication strategy as well as sender and receiver behavior. Specifically, we focus on comparing communication games with messages stating an intention versus a request. Our experimental results show that when a game includes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012432600
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Equity <em>versus</em> Efficiency? Evidence from Three-Person Generosity Experiments
Güth, Werner; Pull, Kerstin; Stadler, Manfred; … - In: Games 1 (2010) 2, pp. 89-102
- efficiency seeking. Our treatments rely on a 2x3 factorial design, differing in whether the responder or the third (dummy) player …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008682986
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Incomplete information about social preferences explains equal division and delay in bargaining
Kohler, Stefan - In: Games 3 (2012) 3, pp. 119-137
-interest or envy, of one bargaining party as private information in a three period game of bargaining and preference screening and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010369374
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Informational hold up and intermediaries
Utgoff, Naomi - In: Games 13 (2022) 5, pp. 1-14
Why do some incomplete information markets feature intermediaries while others do not? I study the allocation of two goods in an incomplete information setting with a single principal, multiple agents with unit demand, and interdependent valuations. I construct a novel dynamic mechanism...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014418049
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Information sharing in oligopoly : sharing groups and core-periphery architectures
Currarini, Sergio; Feri, Francesco - In: Games 12 (2021) 4, pp. 1-17
The trade-off between the costs and benefits of disclosing a firm's private information has been the object of a vast literature. The absence of incentives to share information on a common market demand prior to competition has been advocated to interpret information sharing as evidence of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013171765
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The evolution of reputation-based cooperation in regular networks
Sasaki, Tatsuya; Yamamoto, Hitoshi; Okada, Isamu; … - In: Games 8 (2017) 1, pp. 1-16
Despite recent advances in reputation technologies, it is not clear how reputation systems can affect human cooperation in social networks. Although it is known that two of the major mechanisms in the evolution of cooperation are spatial selection and reputation-based reciprocity, theoretical...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011621316
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Against all odds : tentative steps toward efficient information sharing in groups
Schlangenotto, Darius; Schnedler, Wendelin; Vadovič, … - In: Games 11 (2020) 3/31, pp. 1-24
When groups face difficult problems, the voices of experts may be lost in the noise of others' contributions. We present results from a "naturally noisy" setting, a large first-year undergraduate class, in which the expert's voice was "lost" to such a degree that bringing forward even more...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012432144