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A note on time inconsistency and endogenous exits from a currency union

Saito, Yuta - In: Games 13 (2022) 2, pp. 1-8

. In our currency union model, the inflation rate of the common currency is determined by majority voting among N member …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013200177

Representations of political power structures by strategically stable game forms: A survey

Peleg, Bezalel; Holzman, Ron - In: Games 8 (2017) 4, pp. 1-17

We survey the results on representations of committees and constitutions by game forms that possess some kind of equilibrium strategies for each profile of preferences of the players. The survey is restricted to discrete models, that is, we deal with finitely many players and alternatives. No...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011852712

Representations of political power structures by strategically stable game forms : a survey

Peleg, Bezalel; Holzman, Ron - In: Games 8 (2017) 4, pp. 1-17

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011771308

A note on time inconsistency and endogenous exits from a currency union

Saito, Yuta - In: Games 13 (2022) 2, pp. 1-8

. In our currency union model, the inflation rate of the common currency is determined by majority voting among N member …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013172401

Examining monotonicity and saliency using level-k reasoning in a voting game

Bassi, Anna; Williams, Kenneth C. - In: Games 5 (2014) 1, pp. 26-52

voting experiments. To evaluate the effect of complexity we adopt a level-k reasoning model concept. This model by Nagel [1 …, increasing payoff amounts does promote more strategic behavior in a significant manner. Our results show with complex voting …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010242048

The number of parties and decision-making in legislatures

Bannikova, Marina; Jelnov, Artyom; Jelnov, Pavel - In: Games 12 (2021) 4, pp. 1-10

This paper proposes a model of a legislature, formed by several parties, which has to vote for or against a certain bill in the presence of a lobbyist interested in a certain vote outcome. We show that the ease with which the lobbyist can manipulate a legislature decision increases with the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012649703

Examining monotonicity and saliency using level-k reasoning in a voting game

Bassi, Anna; Williams, Kenneth C. - In: Games 5 (2014) 1, pp. 26-52

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010369371

The number of parties and decision-making in legislatures

Bannikova, Marina; Jelnov, Artyom; Jelnov, Pavel - In: Games 12 (2021) 4, pp. 1-10

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013200138

Luxembourg in the early days of the EEC : null player or not?

Mayer, Alexander - In: Games 9 (2018) 2/29, pp. 1-12

Voters whose yes-or-no decision never makes a difference to the outcome in a simple voting game are known as “null … comprehensive picture of Luxembourg’s role in EEC’s voting system. The assessment of Luxembourg’s voting power is sensitive to the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011849529

Weighted scoring committees

Mayer, Alexander; Napel, Stefan - In: Games 12 (2021) 4, pp. 1-17

Weighted committees allow shareholders, party leaders, etc. to wield different numbers of votes or voting weights as … such as plurality, Borda, or antiplurality rule. Many different weights induce the same mapping from committee members …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012698221