produce for the endogenous formation of an international counterterror coalition. We show that there are quite reasonable … counterterror coalition, holding the choices of all other nations as given. The incentives to join the coalition are the group …-specific benefits from retaliation enjoyed by each coalition member, the relatively lower spillover benefit from retaliation enjoyed by …

agents. The coalition with the greatest power wins the resource and divides it among its members via proportional sharing. We … by the coalition formation model with farsighted agents. …

A standard result of coalition formation games is that stable coalitions are very small if the coalition plays Nash vis … coalition are possible if the marginal abatement cost is concave. The paper confirms this result, but shows that abatement … activities by large coalitions smaller than the grand coalition can be very small. This can be ‘repaired’ only by assuming that …

Coalition formation is often analysed in an almost non-cooperative way, as a two-stage game that consists of a first … coalition structures with abstract physical games in terms of qualitative properties of their primitives. …

-cooperative solution yields the best results, the noncooperative solution fares worst and the coalition games lie in between, with a broad … coalition of the fiscally more responsible countries and the central bank against the less thrifty countries coming closest to …

We consider three-sided coalition formation problems when each agent is concerned about his local status as measured by … the average rankings of the other types of groups. We show that a core stable coalition structure always exists, provided …

recursive core coalition structure may be either coarser or finer than the one that maximizes the social surplus. Moreover, the … general games, including non-superadditive games where the grand coalition does not form in equilibrium. We do not put any …

A set of coalition structures P is farsightedly stable (i) if all possible deviations from any coalition structure p … belonging to P to a coalition structure outside P are deterred by the threat of ending worse off or equally well off, (ii) if … there exists a farsighted improvingpath from any coalition structure outside the set leading to some coalition structure in …