Ortner et al. (Manage. Account. Res. 36(1):43–50, 2017) propose the State-Contingent Relative Benefit Cost Allocation Scheme as an incentive system for risky investment decisions. The note at hand reveals the information distribution implicitly assumed within the framework of this study. Based...

Schosser (Games 2018, 9, 26) claims to have found an alternative solution to design appropriate performance measures than the State-Contingent Relative Benefit Cost Allocation (RBCA) introduced by Ortner et al. (Management Accounting Research 2017, 36, 43–50), which he states is simpler and...

I address the comments made by Ortner (Games 9(4): 93, 2018) in relation to my note “Incentive Systems for Risky Investment Decisions Under Unknown Preferences: Ortner et al. Revisited” (Games 9(2): 26, 2018).

The main goal of collective punishment (CP) is the deterrence of future "wrong-doing" by freedom fighters or terrorists, protesters against an authoritative government, polluters, students playing pranks on their teacher, football teams lacking enthusiasm, or soldiers showing cowardice to the...

The main goal of collective punishment (CP) is the deterrence of future "wrong-doing" by freedom fighters or terrorists, protesters against an authoritative government, polluters, students playing pranks on their teacher, football teams lacking enthusiasm, or soldiers showing cowardice to the...

Ortner et al. (Manage. Account. Res. 36(1):43-50, 2017) propose the State-Contingent Relative Benefit Cost Allocation Scheme as an incentive system for risky investment decisions. The note at hand reveals the information distribution implicitly assumed within the framework of this study. Based...

Schosser (Games 2018, 9, 26) claims to have found an alternative solution to design appropriate performance measures than the State-Contingent Relative Benefit Cost Allocation (RBCA) introduced by Ortner et al. (Management Accounting Research 2017, 36, 43-50), which he states is simpler and more...

I address the comments made by Ortner (Games 9(4): 93, 2018) in relation to my note 'Incentive Systems for Risky Investment Decisions Under Unknown Preferences: Ortner et al. Revisited' (Games 9(2): 26, 2018).

In this article, we consider technology leaders (which are innovators) and technology followers (which are non-innovators) to provide a new theoretical explanation for the well-cited empirical evidence of an inverted-U relationship between competition and aggregate innovation. We consider a...

One of the standard predictions of the agency theory is that more incentives can be given to agents with lower risk aversion. In this paper, we show that this relationship may be absent or reversed when the technology is endogenous and projects with a higher efficiency are also riskier. Using a...