Showing 1 - 10 of 513
We study strategic voting in a setting where voters choose from three options and Condorcet cycles may occur. We introduce in the electorate heterogeneity in preference intensity by allowing voters to differ in the extent to which they value the three options. Three information conditions are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010240827
We experimentally investigate whether human subjects are willing to give up individual freedom in return for the benefits of improved coordination. We conduct a modified iterated public goods game in which subjects in each period first decide which of two groups to join. One group employs a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010240835
In this paper, we study the Nash implementation in an allocation problem with single-dipped preferences. We show that, with at least three agents, Maskin monotonicity is necessary and sufficient for implementation. We examine the implementability of various social choice correspondences (SCCs)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009753711
We survey the results on representations of committees and constitutions by game forms that possess some kind of equilibrium strategies for each profile of preferences of the players. The survey is restricted to discrete models, that is, we deal with finitely many players and alternatives. No...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011771308
This paper studies how the cost of delay and voting order affect agents' decisions in a unanimity voting mechanism. Specifically, we consider two-voter conclaves with commonly known preferences over two alternatives, the cost of delay, and the following novelty: each voter has a subjective...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014418159
This paper analyses the voting behavior of the parliamentary groups in the Regional Assembly of Madrid to appoint the Bureau, its representative body, in all the legislatures since its inception (1983-2021). To this end, the actual result of the voting is compared with the mock result attained...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012698201
Weighted committees allow shareholders, party leaders, etc. to wield different numbers of votes or voting weights as they decide between multiple candidates by a given social choice method. We consider committees that apply scoring methods such as plurality, Borda, or antiplurality rule. Many...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012698221
Herein, we prove a Condorcet jury theorem (CJT) for large elections with multiple alternatives. Voters have common interests that depend on an unknown state of nature. Each voter receives an imprecise private signal about the state of nature and then submits one vote (simple plurality rule). We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012168613
We design an experiment to test how voters vote in a small committee election with three alternatives. Voters have common preferences that depend on an unknown state of nature. Each voter receives an imprecise private signal prior to the election and then casts a vote. The alternative with the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012061937
In a model of simultaneous voting, Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) consider the possibility that jurors vote strategically, rather than sincerely reflecting their individual information. This results in the counterintuitive result that a jury is more likely to convict the innocent under a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013172468