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Generalized trust, need for cognitive closure, and the perceived acceptability of personal data collection
Chavanne, David - In: Games 9 (2018) 2/18, pp. 1-18
This vignette-based study examines how generalized trust and the need for cognitive closure relate to the perceived acceptability of contemporary business methods of personal data collection. Subjects are exposed to four scenarios that describe a method of personal data collection, involving...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011849251
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Optimal incentives in a principal-agent model with endogenous technology
Marini, Marco A.; Polidori, Paolo; Teobaldelli, Désirée; … - In: Games 9 (2018) 1, pp. 1-13
One of the standard predictions of the agency theory is that more incentives can be given to agents with lower risk aversion. In this paper, we show that this relationship may be absent or reversed when the technology is endogenous and projects with a higher efficiency are also riskier. Using a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011852723
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Competition and innovation in markets with technology leaders
Tsao, Ku-Chu; Mukherjee, Arijit; Ray, Achintya - In: Games 13 (2022) 1, pp. 1-20
In this article, we consider technology leaders (which are innovators) and technology followers (which are non-innovators) to provide a new theoretical explanation for the well-cited empirical evidence of an inverted-U relationship between competition and aggregate innovation. We consider a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013200166
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Competition and innovation in markets with technology leaders
Tsao, Ku-Chu; Mukherjee, Arijit; Ray, Achintya - In: Games 13 (2022) 1, pp. 1-20
In this article, we consider technology leaders (which are innovators) and technology followers (which are non-innovators) to provide a new theoretical explanation for the well-cited empirical evidence of an inverted-U relationship between competition and aggregate innovation. We consider a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013171861
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Optimal incentives in a principal-agent model with endogenous technology
Marini, Marco; Polidori, Paolo; Teobaldelli, Désirée; … - In: Games 9 (2018) 1/6, pp. 1-13
One of the standard predictions of the agency theory is that more incentives can be given to agents with lower risk aversion. In this paper, we show that this relationship may be absent or reversed when the technology is endogenous and projects with a higher efficiency are also riskier. Using a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011848346
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Alleviation and sanctions in social dilemma games
Drouvelis, Michalis - In: Games 6 (2015) 3, pp. 368-380
This paper reports an experiment which compares behaviour in two punishment regimes: (i) a standard public goods game with punishment in which subjects are given the opportunity to punish other group members (democratic punishment regime) and (ii) a public goods game environment where all group...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011380878
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Competitive centipede games : zero-end payoffs and payoff inequality deter reciprocal cooperation
Krockow, Eva M.; Pulford, Briony D.; Colman, Andrew M. - In: Games 6 (2015) 3, pp. 262-272
Reciprocal cooperation can be studied in the Centipede game, in which two players alternate in choosing between a … investigated cooperation in four Centipede games differing in their payoffs at the game's end (positive versus zero) and payoff … high payoff inequality were found to reduce cooperation significantly. Contrary to previous predictions, combining these …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011316544
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Should law keep pace with society? : relative update rates determine the co-evolution of institutional punishment and citizen contributions to public goods
Roithmayr, Daria; Isakov, Alexander; Rand, David - In: Games 6 (2015) 2, pp. 124-149
Until recently, theorists considering the evolution of human cooperation have paid little attention to institutional … maximize compliance? We investigate this question by modeling the co-evolution of law and cooperation in a public goods game …' updating of their contribution strategy and observe the effect on Citizen cooperation. We find that when States have unlimited …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011316651
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Punishment, cooperation, and cheater detection in "noisy" social exchange
Bornstein, Gary; Weisel, Ori - In: Games 1 (2010) 1, pp. 18-33
Explaining human cooperation in large groups of non-kin is a major challenge to both rational choice theory and the … theory of evolution. Recent research suggests that group cooperation can be explained by positing that cooperators can punish … information conditions, where cheating is less obvious, punishment is much less effective in enforcing cooperation. Evidently, the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009751389
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Coevolution of cooperation, response to adverse social ties and network structure
Segbroeck, Sven Van; Santos, Francisco C.; Pacheco, Jorge M. - In: Games 1 (2010) 3, pp. 317-337
increase of cooperation, which is here extended to all two-player social dilemmas. In addition, we discuss the role of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009751966