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Social pressure in networks induces public good provision
Jimenez-Gomez, David - In: Games 12 (2021) 1/4, pp. 1-17
I develop a dynamic model with forward looking agents, and show that social pressure is effective in generating provision in a public good game: after a small group of agents start contributing to the public good, other agents decide to contribute as well due to a fear of being punished, and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012432525
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Computational behavioral models for public goods games on social networks
Tomassini, Marco; Antonioni, Alberto - In: Games 10 (2019) 3/35, pp. 1-14
during the actual experiment. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012062305
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Framing and feedback in social dilemmas with partners and strangers
Cox, Caleb A.; Stoddard, Brock - In: Games 6 (2015) 4, pp. 394-412
We study framing effects in repeated social dilemmas by comparing payoff-equivalent Give- and Take-framed public goods games under varying matching mechanisms (Partners or Strangers) and levels of feedback (Aggregate or Individual). In the Give-framed game, players contribute to a public good,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011383730
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Memory recall bias of overconfident and underconfident individuals after feedback
Li, King King - In: Games 13 (2022) 3, pp. 1-15
We experimentally investigate the memory recall bias of overconfident (underconfident) individuals after receiving …). Second, awareness of one's overconfidence or underconfidence does not eliminate memory recall bias. Third, the primacy effect … is stronger than the recency effect. Overall, our results suggest that memory recall bias is mainly due to motivated …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013252749
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Group size, coordination, and the effectiveness of punishment in the voluntary contributions mechanism : an experimental investigation
Xu, Bin; Cadsby, Charles Bram; Fan, Liangcong; Song, Fei - In: Games 4 (2013) 1, pp. 89-105
We examine the effectiveness of the individual-punishment mechanism in larger groups, comparing groups of four to groups of 40 participants. We find that the individual punishment mechanism is remarkably robust when the marginal per capita return (MPCR), i.e. the return to each participant from...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009754878
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Recent advances in experimental studies of social dilemma games
Chaudhuri, Ananish - In: Games 7 (2016) 1, pp. 1-11
I provide a broad overview of the findings reported in the articles submitted for this special volume on experimental studies of social dilemma problems. I start by providing a synopsis of where current research stands on this topic. Then I go on to discuss the specific papers and how those...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011453100
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Punishment strategies across societies : conventional wisdoms reconsidered
Suleiman, Ramzi; Samid, Yuval - In: Games 12 (2021) 3, pp. 1-23
reconsiders the generality of both explanations. Using data from a public goods experiment with punishment, conducted by the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012607461
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Economic harmony : a rational theory of fairness and cooperation in strategic interactions
Suleiman, Ramzi - In: Games 13 (2022) 3, pp. 1-21
Experimental studies show that the Nash equilibrium and its refinements are poor predictors of behavior in non-cooperative strategic games. Cooperation models, such as ERC and inequality aversion, yield superior predictions compared to the standard game theory predictions. However, those models...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013252726
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Belief heterogeneity and the restart effect in a public goods game
Chaudhuri, Ananish - In: Games 9 (2018) 4/96, pp. 1-20
We explore how subjects with heterogeneous beliefs respond to a surprise restart in a linear public goods game played for 20 rounds using either a "partners" or a "strangers" protocol. There are two restarts: one prior to Round 11 and another prior to Round 16. We elicit subject beliefs at the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012014922
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Prescriptive norms and social comparisons
Michaeli, Moti; Spiro, Daniel - In: Games 9 (2018) 4/97, pp. 1-12
This paper analyzes the equilibrium strength of prescriptive norms to contribute to public goods. We consider three methods of establishing what an acceptable contribution to the public good is. Under the first method, the contribution of the bottom contributor is the reference point by which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012014923