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Does implicit bias predict dictator giving?

Lee, Daniel J. - In: Games 9 (2018) 4/73, pp. 1-19

itself under conditions of implicit bias. In doing so, I pair the Implicit Association Test (IAT), commonplace in other … meaningful difference between having an implicit bias and acting on one. As such, results can be thought of as a bound on the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011905090

Computational behavioral models for public goods games on social networks

Tomassini, Marco; Antonioni, Alberto - In: Games 10 (2019) 3/35, pp. 1-14

during the actual experiment. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012062305

Social pressure in networks induces public good provision

Jimenez-Gomez, David - In: Games 12 (2021) 1/4, pp. 1-17

I develop a dynamic model with forward looking agents, and show that social pressure is effective in generating provision in a public good game: after a small group of agents start contributing to the public good, other agents decide to contribute as well due to a fear of being punished, and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012432525

Framing and feedback in social dilemmas with partners and strangers

Cox, Caleb A.; Stoddard, Brock - In: Games 6 (2015) 4, pp. 394-412

We study framing effects in repeated social dilemmas by comparing payoff-equivalent Give- and Take-framed public goods games under varying matching mechanisms (Partners or Strangers) and levels of feedback (Aggregate or Individual). In the Give-framed game, players contribute to a public good,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011383730

Memory recall bias of overconfident and underconfident individuals after feedback

Li, King King - In: Games 13 (2022) 3, pp. 1-15

We experimentally investigate the memory recall bias of overconfident (underconfident) individuals after receiving …). Second, awareness of one's overconfidence or underconfidence does not eliminate memory recall bias. Third, the primacy effect … is stronger than the recency effect. Overall, our results suggest that memory recall bias is mainly due to motivated …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013252749

Group size, coordination, and the effectiveness of punishment in the voluntary contributions mechanism : an experimental investigation

Xu, Bin; Cadsby, Charles Bram; Fan, Liangcong; Song, Fei - In: Games 4 (2013) 1, pp. 89-105

We examine the effectiveness of the individual-punishment mechanism in larger groups, comparing groups of four to groups of 40 participants. We find that the individual punishment mechanism is remarkably robust when the marginal per capita return (MPCR), i.e. the return to each participant from...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009754878

Recent advances in experimental studies of social dilemma games

Chaudhuri, Ananish - In: Games 7 (2016) 1, pp. 1-11

I provide a broad overview of the findings reported in the articles submitted for this special volume on experimental studies of social dilemma problems. I start by providing a synopsis of where current research stands on this topic. Then I go on to discuss the specific papers and how those...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011453100

Anger management : aggression and punishment in the provision of public goods

Gee, Laura K.; Lyu, Xinxin; Urry, Heather - In: Games 8 (2017) 1, pp. 1-28

aggression. In this lab experiment, we find that adopting an objective attitude (objective), through a form of emotion regulation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011621328

Belief heterogeneity and the restart effect in a public goods game

Chaudhuri, Ananish - In: Games 9 (2018) 4/96, pp. 1-20

We explore how subjects with heterogeneous beliefs respond to a surprise restart in a linear public goods game played for 20 rounds using either a "partners" or a "strangers" protocol. There are two restarts: one prior to Round 11 and another prior to Round 16. We elicit subject beliefs at the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012014922

Prescriptive norms and social comparisons

Michaeli, Moti; Spiro, Daniel - In: Games 9 (2018) 4/97, pp. 1-12

This paper analyzes the equilibrium strength of prescriptive norms to contribute to public goods. We consider three methods of establishing what an acceptable contribution to the public good is. Under the first method, the contribution of the bottom contributor is the reference point by which...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012014923