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Core stability and core selection in a decentralized labor matching market

Nax, Heinrich H.; Pradelski, Bary S. R. - In: Games 7 (2016) 2, pp. 1-16

We propose a dynamic model of decentralized many-to-one matching in the context of a competitive labor market. Through …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011453256

Informational hold up and intermediaries

Utgoff, Naomi - In: Games 13 (2022) 5, pp. 1-14

Why do some incomplete information markets feature intermediaries while others do not? I study the allocation of two goods in an incomplete information setting with a single principal, multiple agents with unit demand, and interdependent valuations. I construct a novel dynamic mechanism...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014418049

Core stability and core selection in a decentralized labor matching market

Nax, Heinrich H.; Pradelski, Bary S. R. - In: Games 7 (2016) 2, pp. 1-16

We propose a dynamic model of decentralized many-to-one matching in the context of a competitive labor market. Through …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011709879

Divorce costs and marital dissolution in a one-to-one matching framework with nontransferable utilities

Sağlam, İsmail - In: Games 4 (2013) 1, pp. 106-124

In this paper, we use a two-period one-to-one matching model with incomplete information to examine the effect of … whether to stay married or to unilaterally divorce. We show that, for any society, there exist matching environments where the … probability of the marital dissolution does not reduce divorce costs under gender-optimal matching rules. In such environments, an …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009754874

Matching with nonexclusive contracts

Ripperger-Suhler, Daniel - In: Games 15 (2024) 2, pp. 1-38

-sided matching, in which principals and agents choose between exclusive and nonexclusive contracts with cost-of-effort inefficiencies …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014636236

Subjective homophily and the fixtures problem

Duggan, Joseph E. - In: Games 11 (2020) 1/11, pp. 1-13

The Stable Fixtures problem (Irving and Scott (2007)) is a generalized matching model that nests the well-known Stable … sufficient to ensure that starting from an arbitrary matching, a decentralized process of allowing the sequential matching of … randomly chosen blocking pairs will converge to a pairwise-stable matching with probability one. Strategic implications of this …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012167988

A game theoretic model of adversaries and media manipulation

Hausken, Kjell - In: Games 10 (2019) 4/48, pp. 1-15

A model is developed for two players exerting media manipulation efforts to support each of two actors who interact …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012167778

Countervailing conflicts of interest in delegation games

Chiba, Saori; Leong, Kaiwen - In: Games 14 (2023) 6, pp. 1-20

In this paper, we investigate optimal delegation mechanisms in the presence of countervailing conflicts of interest in the context of principal-agent problems. We introduce two dimensions of conflict of interest-pandering incentives related to the outside option and project biases. We compare...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014443303

Efficient decentralized leadership under hybrid work and attachment to regions

Aoyama, Naoto; Silva, Emilson C. D. - In: Games 14 (2023) 2, pp. 1-18

Under the 'new normal' in the labor market, individuals can work remotely or in person, a hybrid work mode that became ubiquitous during the pandemic. This paper studies the efficiency of decentralized leadership in federations in which hybrid work is the modus operandi. Self-interested regional...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014422292

Anticipated communication in the ultimatum game

Capizzani, Mario; Mittone, Luigi; Musau, Andrew; … - In: Games 8 (2017) 3, pp. 1-20

Anticipated verbal feedback in a dictator game has been shown to induce altruistic behavior. However, in the ultimatum game which, apart from generosity, entails a strategic component since a proposer may (rightly) fear that the responder will reject a low offer, it remains an open question...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011852695