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Repeated Play of Families of Games by Resource-Constrained Players

Nikandrova, Arina - In: Games 4 (2013) 3, pp. 339-346

This paper studies a repeated play of a family of games by resource-constrained players. To economize on reasoning resources, the family of games is partitioned into subsets of games which players do not distinguish. An example is constructed to show that when games are played a finite number of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010675955

Tacit Collusion under Fairness and Reciprocity

İriş, Doruk; Santos-Pinto, Luís - In: Games 4 (2013) 1, pp. 50-65

This paper departs from the standard profit-maximizing model of firm behavior by assuming that firms are motivated in part by personal animosity–or respect–towards their competitors. A reciprocal firm responds to unkind behavior of rivals with unkind actions (negative reciprocity), while at...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011030515

Patience or Fairness? Analyzing Social Preferences in Repeated Games

Duffy, John; Muñoz-García, Félix - In: Games 3 (2012) 1, pp. 56-77

This paper investigates how the introduction of social preferences affects players’ equilibrium behavior in both the one-shot and the infinitely repeated version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. We show that fairness concerns operate as a ”substitute” for time discounting in the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011030523

An Adaptive Learning Model in Coordination Games

Funai, Naoki - In: Games 4 (2013) 4, pp. 648-669

In this paper, we provide a theoretical prediction of the way in which adaptive players behave in the long run in normal form games with strict Nash equilibria. In the model, each player assigns subjective payoff assessments to his own actions, where the assessment of each action is a weighted...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010711826

Coordination Games and Local Interactions: A Survey of the Game Theoretic Literature

Weidenholzer, Simon - In: Games 1 (2010) 4, pp. 551-585

local interactions. Amongst others, we discuss best reply learning in a global- and in a local- interaction framework and … best reply learning in multiple location models and in a network formation context. Further, we discuss imitation learning …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008756384

Bounded Memory, Inertia, Sampling and Weighting Model for Market Entry Games

Chen, Wei; Liu, Shu-Yu; Chen, Chih-Han; Lee, Yi-Shan - In: Games 2 (2011) 1, pp. 187-199

This paper describes the “Bounded Memory, Inertia, Sampling and Weighting” (BI-SAW) model, which won the http://sites.google.com/site/gpredcomp/Market Entry Prediction Competition in 2010. The BI-SAW model refines the I-SAW Model (Erev et al. [1]) by adding the assumption of limited memory...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009025196

Market Entry Prediction Competition 2010

Hariskos, Wasilios; Leder, Johannes; Teodorescu, Kinneret - In: Games 2 (2011) 2, pp. 200-208

We submitted three models to the competition which were based on the I-SAW model. The models introduced four new assumptions. In the first model an adjustment process was introduced through which the tendency for exploration was higher at the beginning and decreased over time in the exploration...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009025198

Learning in Networks—An Experimental Study Using Stationary Concepts

Berninghaus, Siegfried K.; Neumann, Thomas; Vogt, Bodo - In: Games 5 (2014) 3, pp. 140-159

Our study analyzes theories of learning for strategic interactions in networks. Participants played two of the 2 × 2 …, payoff-sampling equilibrium, and impulse balance equilibrium) which represent the long-run equilibrium of a learning process …. Secondly, we relate our results to four different learning models (impulse-matching learning, action-sampling learning, self …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011030494

Conditional Cooperation and the Marginal per Capita Return in Public Good Games

Cartwright, Edward J.; Lovett, Denise - In: Games 5 (2014) 4, pp. 234-256

We investigate experimentally whether the extent of conditional cooperation in public good games depends on the marginal per capita return (MPCR) to the public good and type of game. The MPCR is varied from 0.2 to 0.4 to 0.8. The ‘standard’ game, in which three players contribute before a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010970523

On the Three-Person Game Baccara Banque

Ethier, Stewart N.; Lee, Jiyeon - In: Games 6 (2015) 2, pp. 57-78

<em>Baccara banque</em> is a three-person zero-sum game parameterized by \(\theta\in(0,1)\). A study of the game by Downton and Lockwood claimed that the Nash equilibrium is of only academic interest. Their preferred alternative is what we call the <em>independent cooperative equilibrium</em>. However, this...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011275206

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