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Tacit collusion under fairness and reciprocity

İriş, Doruk; Santos-Pinto, Luís - In: Games 4 (2013) 1, pp. 50-65

This paper departs from the standard profit-maximizing model of firm behavior by assuming that firms are motivated in part by personal animosity–or respect–towards their competitors. A reciprocal firm responds to unkind behavior of rivals with unkind actions (negative reciprocity), while at...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009753710

Is voting for a cartel a sign of cooperativeness?

Gillet, Joris - In: Games 12 (2021) 2, pp. 1-10

This paper tests the hypothesis that a (partial) reason why cartels - collective but costly and non-binding price agreements - lead to higher prices in a Bertrand oligopoly could be because of a selection effect: decision-makers who are willing to form price agreements are more likely to be less...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012547790

Simple voting games and cartel damage proportioning

Napel, Stefan; Welter, Dominik - In: Games 12 (2021) 4, pp. 1-18

Individual contributions by infringing firms to the compensation of cartel victims must reflect their “relative … operationalize this norm is to apply the Shapley value to an equilibrium model of cartel prices. Because calibrating such a model is … describe which cartel configurations can(not) cause significant price increases in an approximate, dichotomous way; then …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012649687

Cartel formation in Cournot competition with asymmetric costs : a partition function approach

Abe, Takaaki - In: Games 12 (2021) 1/14, pp. 1-16

In this paper, we use a partition function form game to analyze cartel formation among firms in Cournot competition. We … level of the cost advantage is "moderate", then the firm with the cost advantage leads the cartel formation among the firms …. Moreover, if the cost advantage is relatively high, then the formed cartel can also be stable in the sense of the core of a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012432603

Collusive stability with relative performance and network externalities

Lu, Yi-Shan; Tsai, Chien-Shu; Lee, Jen Yao; Lee, Chung-Yang - In: Games 15 (2024) 23, pp. 1-7

In this paper, we aim to investigate the collusive stability in the presence of network externalities among firms with relative performance in the firm's objective functions. We demonstrate that collusive stability is increasing (decreasing) in the degree of relative performance, product...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014636244

Cournot's oligopoly equilibrium under different expectations and differentiated production

Grisáková, Nora; Štetka, Peter - In: Games 13 (2022) 6, pp. 1-17

The subject of this study is an oligopolistic market in which three firms operate in an environment of quantitative competition known as the Cournot oligopoly model. Firms and their production are differentiated, which brings the theoretical model closer to real market conditions. The main...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014418202

Ranking supply function and cournot equilibria in a differentiated product duopoly with demand uncertainty

Saglam, Ismail - In: Games 9 (2018) 3, pp. 1-13

In this paper, we provide a welfare ranking for the equilibria of the supply function and quantity competitions in a differentiated product duopoly with demand uncertainty. We prove that the expected consumer surplus is always higher under the supply function competition, irrespective of whether...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012227715

Cartel formation in Cournot competition with asymmetric costs: A partition function approach

Abe, Takaaki - In: Games 12 (2021) 1, pp. 1-16

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013200076

Is voting for a cartel a sign of cooperativeness?

Gillet, Joris - In: Games 12 (2021) 2, pp. 1-10

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013200110

Simple voting games and cartel damage proportioning

Napel, Stefan; Welter, Dominik - In: Games 12 (2021) 4, pp. 1-18

Individual contributions by infringing firms to the compensation of cartel victims must reflect their 'relative … operationalize this norm is to apply the Shapley value to an equilibrium model of cartel prices. Because calibrating such a model is … describe which cartel configurations can(not) cause significant price increases in an approximate, dichotomous way; then …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013200136