Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 475
Cover Image
Voluntary versus enforced team effort
Keser, Claudia; Montmarquette, Claude - In: Games 2 (2011) 3, pp. 277-301
We present a model where each of two players chooses between remuneration based on either private or team effort. Although at least one of the players has the equilibrium strategy to choose private remuneration, we frequently observe both players to choose team remuneration in a series of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009752421
Cover Image
Incentive magnitude effects in experimental games : bigger is not necessarily better
Pulford, Briony D.; Colman, Andrew M.; Loomes, Graham - In: Games 9 (2018) 1/4, pp. 1-10
In experimental games, task-related incentives are payments to experimental subjects that vary according to their strategy choices and the consequent outcomes of the games. Limited evidence exists regarding incentive magnitude effects in experimental games. We examined one-off strategy choices...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011848336
Cover Image
Malevolent governance, intra-group conflict and the paradox of the plenty : an experiment
Puzon, Klarizze Anne; Willinger, Marc - In: Games 7 (2016) 1, pp. 1-11
Using a laboratory experiment, we behaviourally study the impact of a sudden increase in the common-pool size on within …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011453120
Cover Image
Incentive magnitude effects in experimental games: Bigger is not necessarily better
Pulford, Briony D.; Colman, Andrew M.; Loomes, Graham - In: Games 9 (2018) 1, pp. 1-10
In experimental games, task-related incentives are payments to experimental subjects that vary according to their strategy choices and the consequent outcomes of the games. Limited evidence exists regarding incentive magnitude effects in experimental games. We examined one-off strategy choices...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011852721
Cover Image
The price of anarchy for network formation in an adversary model
Kliemann, Lasse - In: Games 2 (2011) 3, pp. 302-332
We study network formation with n players and link cost » 0. After the network is built, an adversary randomly deletes one link according to a certain probability distribution. Cost for player ν incorporates the expected number of players to which ν will become disconnected. We focus on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010369340
Cover Image
Voluntary versus enforced team effort
Keser, Claudia; Montmarquette, Claude - In: Games 2 (2011) 3, pp. 277-301
We present a model where each of two players chooses between remuneration based on either private or team effort. Although at least one of the players has the equilibrium strategy to choose private remuneration, we frequently observe both players to choose team remuneration in a series of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010369350
Cover Image
The price of anarchy for network formation in an adversary model
Kliemann, Lasse - In: Games 2 (2011) 3, pp. 302-332
We study network formation with n players and link cost α 0. After the network is built, an adversary randomly deletes one link according to a certain probability distribution. Cost for player ν incorporates the expected number of players to which ν will become disconnected. We focus on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009752420
Cover Image
Voting in three-alternative committees: An experiment
Goertz, Johanna M. M.; Chernomaz, Kirill - In: Games 10 (2019) 2, pp. 1-23
We design an experiment to test how voters vote in a small committee election with three alternatives. Voters have … election and then casts a vote. The alternative with the most votes wins. We fix the number of voters in our experiment to be … the decision is also relatively high and comes close to predicted levels. In one variation of the experiment, we calculate …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012227765
Cover Image
A condorcet jury theorem for large poisson elections with multiple alternatives
Goertz, Johanna M. M. - In: Games 11 (2020) 1, pp. 1-12
Herein, we prove a Condorcet jury theorem (CJT) for large elections with multiple alternatives. Voters have common interests that depend on an unknown state of nature. Each voter receives an imprecise private signal about the state of nature and then submits one vote (simple plurality rule). We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012227796
Cover Image
Optimal accuracy of unbiased tullock contests with two heterogeneous players
Sahm, Marco - In: Games 13 (2022) 2, pp. 1-6
I characterize the optimal accuracy level r of an unbiased Tullock contest between two players with heterogeneous prize valuations. The designer maximizes the winning probability of the strong player or the winner's expected valuation by choosing a contest with an all-pay auction equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013200180