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Horizon-K farsightedness in criminal networks
Herings, Peter Jean-Jacques; Mauleon, Ana; … - In: Games 12 (2021) 3, pp. 1-13
We study the criminal networks that will emerge in the long run when criminals are neither myopic nor completely farsighted but have some limited degree of farsightedness. We adopt the horizon-K farsighted set to answer this question. We find that in criminal networks with n criminals, the set...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013200118
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Horizon-K farsightedness in criminal networks
Herings, Peter Jean-Jacques; Mauleon, Ana; … - In: Games 12 (2021) 3, pp. 1-13
We study the criminal networks that will emerge in the long run when criminals are neither myopic nor completely farsighted but have some limited degree of farsightedness. We adopt the horizon-K farsighted set to answer this question. We find that in criminal networks with n criminals, the set...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012591503
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Divorce Costs and Marital Dissolution in a One-to-One Matching Framework With Nontransferable Utilities
Saglam, Ismail - In: Games 4 (2013) 1, pp. 106-124
In this paper, we use a two-period one-to-one matching model with incomplete information to examine the effect of … whether to stay married or to unilaterally divorce. We show that, for any society, there exist matching environments where the … probability of the marital dissolution does not reduce divorce costs under gender-optimal matching rules. In such environments, an …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010631541
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Coalition Formation among Farsighted Agents
Herings, P. Jean-Jacques; Mauleon, Ana; Vannetelbosch, … - In: Games 1 (2010) 3, pp. 286-298
of coalition structures and we study the relationship between farsighted stability and other concepts such as the largest …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008682977
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A Note on the Core of TU-cooperative Games with Multiple Membership Externalities
Nax, Heinrich H. - In: Games 5 (2014) 4, pp. 191-203
A generalization of transferable utility cooperative games from the functional forms introduced by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior) and Lucas and Thrall (1963, Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, 10, 281–298) is proposed to allow for multiple...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011030505
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School choice with hybrid schedules
Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz; Dur, Umut Mert; Harris, William - In: Games 12 (2021) 2, pp. 1-11
During the pandemic, school districts have adopted hybrid schedules to continue the education of the students while maintaining social distance. In a hybrid schedule, students in the same classroom are usually divided into two groups and students only in the same group can physically attend...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012503806
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Divorce costs and marital dissolution in a one-to-one matching framework with nontransferable utilities
Sağlam, İsmail - In: Games 4 (2013) 1, pp. 106-124
In this paper, we use a two-period one-to-one matching model with incomplete information to examine the effect of … whether to stay married or to unilaterally divorce. We show that, for any society, there exist matching environments where the … probability of the marital dissolution does not reduce divorce costs under gender-optimal matching rules. In such environments, an …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009754874
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Subjective homophily and the fixtures problem
Duggan, Joseph E. - In: Games 11 (2020) 1/11, pp. 1-13
The Stable Fixtures problem (Irving and Scott (2007)) is a generalized matching model that nests the well-known Stable … sufficient to ensure that starting from an arbitrary matching, a decentralized process of allowing the sequential matching of … randomly chosen blocking pairs will converge to a pairwise-stable matching with probability one. Strategic implications of this …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012167988
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Voluntary leadership and asymmetric endowments in the investment game
Kleine, Fabian; Königstein, Manfred; Rozsnyói, Balázs - In: Games 9 (2018) 3, pp. 1-21
We experimentally investigate variants of the investment game by Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995), in which one of the two players decides who are first mover and second mover. It has been shown by Kleine, Königstein, and Rozsnyói (2014) that voluntary leadership increases both investment and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012227706
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An experimental study of self-enforcing coalitions
Jandoc, Karl Robert L.; Juarez, Ruben - In: Games 10 (2019) 3, pp. 1-32
We study a model in which agents endowed with power compete for a divisible resource by forming coalitions with other agents. The coalition with the greatest power wins the resource and divides it among its members via proportional sharing. We conduct an economic experiment using this model to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012227776