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When groups face difficult problems, the voices of experts may be lost in the noise of others' contributions. We present results from a "naturally noisy" setting, a large first-year undergraduate class, in which the expert's voice was "lost" to such a degree that bringing forward even more...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013200029
We design an experiment to test how voters vote in a small committee election with three alternatives. Voters have common preferences that depend on an unknown state of nature. Each voter receives an imprecise private signal prior to the election and then casts a vote. The alternative with the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012227765
This note provides simple derivations of the equilibrium conditions for different voting games with incomplete information. In the standard voting game à la Austen-Smith and Banks (1996), voters update their beliefs, and, conditional on their being pivotal, cast their votes. However, in voting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012227769
Herein, we prove a Condorcet jury theorem (CJT) for large elections with multiple alternatives. Voters have common interests that depend on an unknown state of nature. Each voter receives an imprecise private signal about the state of nature and then submits one vote (simple plurality rule). We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012227796
This note provides simple derivations of the equilibrium conditions for different voting games with incomplete information. In the standard voting game à la Austen-Smith and Banks (1996), voters update their beliefs, and, conditional on their being pivotal, cast their votes. However, in voting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012061909
We design an experiment to test how voters vote in a small committee election with three alternatives. Voters have common preferences that depend on an unknown state of nature. Each voter receives an imprecise private signal prior to the election and then casts a vote. The alternative with the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012061937
Herein, we prove a Condorcet jury theorem (CJT) for large elections with multiple alternatives. Voters have common interests that depend on an unknown state of nature. Each voter receives an imprecise private signal about the state of nature and then submits one vote (simple plurality rule). We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012168613
When groups face difficult problems, the voices of experts may be lost in the noise of others' contributions. We present results from a "naturally noisy" setting, a large first-year undergraduate class, in which the expert's voice was "lost" to such a degree that bringing forward even more...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012432144
a bargaining-in-proportions set. Then, we obtain a correspondence between classical bargaining solutions and usual … contested garment (Babylonian Talmud) rules can be obtained throughout the Nash bargaining solution. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010503395
This paper analyses a model of legislative bargaining in which parties form tentative coalitions (protocoalitions … follow a counterintuitive pattern: as the bargaining power of weak players within a protocoalition increases, the weak …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011709840