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Adopting the group turnout model of Herrera and Mattozzi, J. Eur. Econ. Assoc. 2010, 8, 838–871, we investigate direct democracy with supermajority rule and different preference intensities for two sides of a referendum: Reform versus status quo. Two parties spend money and effort to mobilize...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012061902
players to which ν will become disconnected. We focus on unilateral link formation and Nash equilibrium. We show existence of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009752420
Adopting the group turnout model of Herrera and Mattozzi, J. Eur. Econ. Assoc. 2010, 8, 838-871, we investigate direct democracy with supermajority rule and different preference intensities for two sides of a referendum: Reform versus status quo. Two parties spend money and effort to mobilize...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012227770
We study strategic voting in a setting where voters choose from three options and Condorcet cycles may occur. We introduce in the electorate heterogeneity in preference intensity by allowing voters to differ in the extent to which they value the three options. Three information conditions are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010240827
. Furthermore, to postulate the effect of financial incentives on subjects' choice, we used the Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE … are enough to induce equilibrium behavior, and the marginal effect of extra incentives on equilibrium behavior seems to be … negligible. High complexity, instead, decreases the rate of convergence to equilibrium play. With a sufficiently high complexity …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010242048
equilibrium strategies where everyone votes sincerely, no group of voters sharing the same preference ordering can gain by …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010422379
The exit of the United Kingdom from the European Union has had profound economic and political effects. Here, we look at a particular aspect, the power distribution in the Council of the European Union. Using the Shapley-Shubik power index, we calculate the member states' powers with and without...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012547825
operationalize this norm is to apply the Shapley value to an equilibrium model of cartel prices. Because calibrating such a model is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012649687
more aggregate information in equilibrium. The aggregate information is infinite with the size going to infinity if and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012650448
We develop a numerical model that simulates the evolution of a virtual population with an incentive and ability-based wage, capital yield from savings, social welfare system, and total income subject to taxation and political turnovers. Meta-heuristics, particle swarm optimization (PSO) in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013252751